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I. INTRODUCTION

There is a growing tendency in transnational contracting to
include an agreement that the parties will arbitrate any disputes that
may arise. This trend has "increased significantly over the past
several decades" to the point where it is seemingly universal in
The parties usually assume that, in the
transnational contracts.'
unlikely event a dispute arises, arbitration will be a faster and cheaper
process resolution than civil litigation. While arbitrations in the
United States and Japan 2 are without doubt faster than litigation,
parties are generally not aware of numerous serious problems that they
should be aware of before they agree to arbitrate any disputes.
The single most critical problem in both Japan and the United
States is the lack of judicial review of arbitrators' reasoning, their
conduct of the arbitration, or the legal or factual basis for the award.
Under United States' law there are a few strictly construed statutory
* Of Counsel, Law Office of Yasuhiro Fujita, Los Angeles, California, Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Southern California School of Law. J.D., Southwestern University School of
Law (1985), LL.M. Asian and Comparative Law, University of Washington School of Law
(1994), Ph.D. Asian and Comparative Law, University of Washington School of Law (1997).
Affiliate Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law (1998-2000).
1. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 5 (1994).

2. This article looks primarily at federal, California, and New York law because the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1999), will apply to all international arbitration contracts,
and parties to transnational contracts normally specify that the law of California or New York
will apply to the extent not preempted by the Act.
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and case law exceptions that will allow only a very limited amount of
judicial review. 3 Under Japanese statutory law there is no right to
judicial review whatsoever. This can result in the legal anomaly, if not
absurdity, of courts enforcing an award yet coming very close to
declaring on the record that the award is not just or equitable.4 This
problem may be somewhat, although never completely, ameliorated
by including in the arbitration agreement a provision that the award
will be subject to judicial review for errors of fact and law.
The second problem in arbitration is that discovery is extremely
limited. By design, the statutory arbitration provisions in the United
States and Japan allow for little discovery in order to expedite the
process and reduce expenses. Paradoxically, however, all manner of
evidence that would not be admissible in civil litigation can be, and
frequently is, admitted into evidence by the arbitrator in the United
States.' Discovery under Japanese law is also very limited (common
law type discovery is not normally allowed in Japan in litigation or
arbitration), and what little may be done is subject to approval and
control by the arbitrators and courts.6 This paper suggests that the
difficulty in obtaining and presenting relevant evidence in both
Japanese and United States arbitrations may be mitigated by the
inclusion of a clause detailing a discovery scheme in the arbitration
agreement.
These problems in American arbitrations should be of great
concern for Japanese legal professionals for several reasons. First,
Japanese parties will usually negotiate contracts without participation
of legal counsel who are knowledgeable in American contract law.
Japanese parties will be even less knowledgeable regarding the
peculiarities of American arbitration law and procedure. Second,
3. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993); CAL. CODE. CIV. PROC. § 1286.2 (1982); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 7511(b) (1998).
4. There is an inherent discomfort in American jurisprudence with a judicial procedure
that will not admit of a disinterested appellate review of the initial hearing or trial even in cases
that are considered outside of the usual civil litigation system. This is well illustrated by the
creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in 1950, which was
designed to provide civilian review of court-martial sentences (traditionally considered an
internal process to maintain order and discipline in the armed services and outside the normal
judicial system). This Court of Appeals replaced what was considered an inherently suspect
internal review by the defendant's commanding officer and the Judge Advocate General of that
particular service. See generally JONATHON LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 1775-1980 (2001). As described below, in
Japan the lack review of the arbitrator's award by the courts can be construed as a deprivation of
a party's constitutional right of access to the judiciary.
5. Farkas v. Receivable Finance Corp., 806 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Va. 1992) (arbitrator
admitted both parole and hearsay evidence).
6. This reflects the normal civil law tradition of judges actively participating in the factfinding process.
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Japanese parties may view arbitration as less confrontational than
litigation and believe that they will be culturally comfortable in
arbitration. Thus, after a dispute has developed, Japanese parties may
find themselves bound to submit the controversy to arbitration when,
in retrospect, arbitration may not have been the wisest choice for
resolving that particular dispute.
In the event the arbitration is conducted in Japan under Japanese
law, the American party is at a similar disadvantage. It goes without
saying that there are relatively few American attorneys who are
knowledgeable in Japanese contract or arbitration law. For American
counsel to agree to an arbitration in Japan or to stipulate that the
contract will be governed by Japanese law may well be flirting with
malpractice.' For American parties and counsel who are familiar with
arbitration in the United States, Japanese arbitration procedure itself is
However, there are
not entirely dissimilar in general outline.
significant differences that American counsel should be aware of.
Whether the arbitration is in the United States under American law,
or in Japan under Japanese law, there are two important aspects of
arbitration that are very similar as noted above: the lack of judicial
review and the very limited discovery.
As most transnational arbitration hearings in the United States
are in New York and California, this paper focuses on the law of
arbitration in those states, with comparative comments on Japanese
law.8 Special attention is given to the conflict between California and
New York arbitration law and the Federal Arbitration Act, the latter
of which applies to transnational contracts as a matter of law. 9
Although generally critical of American and Japanese arbitration law,
it is not the position of the author that the basic premise of either
American or Japanese arbitration law is fundamentally flawed and
should be abandoned. There are circumstances where arbitration is
entirely appropriate and in the best interests of all parties. However,
there are situations where litigation is clearly preferable because of the
facts of the dispute, or the inherent problems of the arbitration system
in either the United States or Japan. This article will describe some of
the above-cited problems in American and Japanese arbitration
7. Although obvious upon reflection, it bears repeating that if American counsel is not
familiar with Japanese law it is impossible to advise the American party how to properly perform
the contract. To blithely assume that Japanese and American contract law is sufficiently similar
such that adequate performance under one law will be adequate in the other is to invite disaster.
8. Another reason for focusing on the United States' law is that Japanese arbitration law,
enacted in 1890 with no essential revisions since that time, was substantially modified in July of
2003, and, moreover, there is a paucity of case law interpreting the old arbitration law.

9. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
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procedure that can lead to a flawed and unjust award. The contracting
parties should be aware of these issues prior to entering into a contract
containing an arbitration clause and determine if, on balance, the
potential areas and subject matters of potential disputes that may arise
under that particular contract indicate whether arbitration or litigation
is the best dispute resolution mechanism.
Upon the determination that arbitration is the preferred method
of dispute resolution (despite the pitfalls of arbitration in both the
United States and Japan), parties should carefully consider the
advisability of including clauses that would detail additional discovery
in the event of a dispute, when such clauses are permitted in the
jurisdiction where the arbitration will be conducted. 10 Likewise,
parties should seriously consider the advisability of including a
provision for a wider scope of judicial review than is provided for
under Japanese and American law. It is highly unlikely that the
inclusion of such provisions would be a "deal breaker" any more than
a bare arbitration clause would. Moreover, such clauses give both
parties the ability to create a specific dispute resolution system that
will best suit the particular nature of the contract and the business
relationship of the parties. 1' Thus, the parties can, at their pleasure,
provide for the amount of discovery they deem proper, and for judicial
review if they deem it in their best interest.
The fundamental reason arbitration, as an alternative to
litigation, has grown in popularity is that it holds the promise of a fast,
economical and (in theory) reasonably predictable means of dispute
resolution. It is certainly the case that arbitration is faster and, on the
surface, less expensive than litigation, but these factors should not be
the sole determining considerations. The "less expensive" arbitration
may, in the final analysis, be far more expensive for a party who lost
the case but should have won under the law and facts, or a party who
10. The author experienced one situation where an arbitration clause provided that the
place of the arbitration was either in Japan under Japanese substantive law or in California under
California substantive law, wherever the request for arbitration was first filed. This kind
alternative jurisdiction provision must be avoided at all costs as parties cannot know under which
substantive law their performance of the contract will be judged, or under which arbitration law.
11. The contract formation process is, as the nomenclature "private law" indicates, a
mutual agreement of the parties to govern their acts in a certain manner. If private contract law
can define the mutual civil obligations and rights of the parties as to the substantive nature of the
contract, it makes no sense that the parties cannot alter, as they see fit, the process of dispute
resolution under that private law contract.
This ability to tailor the level of discovery should be effective in eliminating the abuse of the
civil discovery system that was an important factor in the growth of arbitration. This, with the
inclusion of a wider scope of judicial review, can result in a private dispute resolution system that
has the potential to combine the predictability and reliability of the civil system with the cost and
time saving attributes of the arbitration system.
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won but was not able to present its entire case. The reason is simple:
arbitrators in both the United States and Japan are given virtually
unchecked powers in conducting the arbitration proceeding. First, in
order to make the arbitration process faster and cheaper, discovery is
curtailed severely and controlled by the arbitrators, which may
prevent a party from discovering critical evidence. Second, arbitrators
are not required to apply the correct substantive law or even the
provisions of the contract itself, and may even enact their own
personal concept of the law as they see fit. Finally, the arbitrator may
refuse to admit relevant evidence, ignore relevant evidence if it is
admitted, or admit irrelevant evidence, all at their discretion. All of
these abuses are virtually immune from judicial review; much less will
such acts be grounds to vacate arbitrators' awards. Consequently, the
uniformity and predictability of arbitration hearings, even with similar
factual and legal claims, cannot be assured.
Part II of this article discusses in detail how the arbitration
process in both the United States and Japan can very often result in
injustice to both parties. This Part describes how limitations on
discovery can cause vital information necessary to either prosecute or
defend a claim to never appear before the arbitrator. The article then
discusses the possibility of including provisions that might ameliorate
this problem. Next, this Part examines specific examples of situations
where the arbitrators can ignore the civil rules of evidence and admit
evidence that would be inadmissible in a court of law. Finally, this
Part concludes with a discussion of the very limited scope of judicial
review of arbitral awards that is allowed by statue in the United States
and Japan. Part III introduces the concept of including a provision in
arbitration contracts for judicial review of arbitrators' errors of law or
fact, and, most important, identifies the jurisdictions where such a
provision will be recognized. Part IV offers some conclusory thoughts
regarding the practical implications of the limitations on arbitration.
When counsel discusses with clients whether or not to include an
arbitration clause in a contract, the power of the arbitrators needs to be
accurately described. The various arbitration statutes and arbitration
association rules grant the arbitrator near dictatorial powers over the
arbitration process. This article will illustrate how, in the United
States and Japan, arbitrators can, and on occasion will, exercise lawmaking imperium powers more extensive than that of those of the
Pretors in ancient Rome. 2 Arbitrators can misinterpret the applicable
12. Imperium was the law-making power vested in officials called Praetors, who could
loosely be termed judges, by the authority of the Consuls in the Republic and the Emperor in the
Empire. See generally BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 3-4, 23-27
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law, or simply disregard it by making their own version of the law. 3
Arbitrators can grossly misconstrue the facts, or simply disregard
them entirely in making a decision, and they can determine what
evidence to admit irrespective of the long established rules of evidence,
even if by doing so the parties cannot test the validity of the evidence
through cross-examination. Arbitrators can even misinterpret the
provisions of the underlying contract dispute, and misinterpret
conditions and restrictions in the arbitration agreement itself. If the
arbitrator does any of these things, there will be no remedy as there is
generally no judicial review of arbitrators' acts, and the courts will not
vacate the award. Even in Imperial Rome no Pretor would have
dared exercise his power in such an undisciplined and arbitrary
manner,1 4 and certainly no common law or civil law judge today would
dream of possessing, much less actually using, such power. Yet in
arbitration the parties grant this ungoverned imperium to the
arbitrators.

(1962); J.A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME, (1967), 68-74. Although the Prators did not
try the cases (this was done by laymen called the iudex) they made law in the sense that they
enunciated the legal issues the parties litigated (much like the old English common law pleading
forms), and when they did so, it was firmly based on long established legal doctrines and Greek
philosophy. Id. at 74. A new pronouncement of law was never based on the whim of the
Praetor, and the Praetor could no more ignore the facts than a judge can today.
Papinianus, one of the more renowned Roman jurists, wrote the following on the relationship
of the power of the Prators to make law and the traditional sources of Roman law:
The Civil Law is that which is derived from statutory enactments, plebiscites, decrees
of the Senate, edicts of the Emperors, and the authority of learned men. (1) The
praetorian law is that which the Pretors introduced for the purpose of aiding,
supplementing, or amending, the Civil Law, for the public welfare; which is also
designated honorary law, being so called after the "honor" of the Praetors.
DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN [hereinafter DIG.] 1.1.7 (Papinianus, Definitions 2), in CORPUS JURIS
CIVILIS: THE CIVIL LAW, VOLUME 1 & 2, at 210 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., AMS Press 1973).
Marcianus stated: "For honorary law itself is the living voice of the Civil Law." DIG. 1.1.8
(Marcianus, Institutes 1), in id.
13. Indeed, at times the arbitrators may feel that they have more power then civil judges,
and can write statutory law as they please. The author participated in one arbitration in
California where the lead arbitrator demanded that a Japanese corporation produce as witnesses
individuals living in Japan who were retired from the corporation, and produce other individuals
living in Japan who were not even employees of the party. Upon the Japanese company's
declining to do so under substantive California law, the arbitrators made a point of making a
negative inference.
This is, perhaps, one of the most mischievous aspects of the arbitrator's power. There is no
possible way for the parties to anticipate during the performance of the contract how the
substantive law may be changed by the arbitrator. For example, in one arbitration involving the
author, the arbitrators added the requirement of consideration in a Uniform Commercial Code
sale governed by California Commercial Code section 2-209.
14. This would be an intolerable affront to the Greek ideas of aequitas and corrective or
rectificatory justice.
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In civil litigation in both the United States and Japan, the trial
judges (and the parties) know that if the judges deviate from
established civil procedure statutes, play fast and loose with the facts,
ignore or misinterpret the contractual obligations of the parties, or
misconstrue and fail to apply the correct law, the appellate courts will
reverse or remand the case. In arbitration, the prophylactic role of a
supervising higher authority is not present and there is no reason to
assume, as the United States and Japanese arbitration systems appear
to do, that the arbitrators are more judicially responsible than duly
appointed judges; thus, precluding the need for appellate review. In
arbitration, judicial review will only be granted when the parties allege
that the arbitrators made mistakes in the procedure that are statutorily
recognized as grounds for vacation of the award.' In both the United
States and Japan those grounds are exceedingly narrow and do not
include errors of fact or law. 6
In the United States, the usual grounds to vacate an award (and
trigger limited judicial review), are exemplified by the Federal
Arbitration Act. 7 Specifically, a reviewing court will vacate the award
for the following reasons: (1) the parties did not have notice of the
arbitration or were otherwise unable to participate in the arbitration;
(2) the matter arbitrated was not covered by the arbitration agreement;
(3) the arbitrators refused to accept relevant evidence or refused to
postpone the hearing for good cause; (4) the arbitrators were guilty of
corruption, fraud or other misconduct; (5) the arbitrators were partia!
to a party; or (6) if the award is so imperfect that it cannot be deemed
definitive. 8 In Japan, the grounds are even narrower. Japan's 2003
Arbitration law provides that the award may be set aside if: (1) a party
was legally incapacitated; (2) a party did not have notice of the
arbitration or the selection of the arbitrators; (3) a party was not able
to defend the action; (4) there was no enforceable agreement to
arbitrate that particular issue; (5) the arbitration was not conducted in
accordance with the agreement; (6) the matter could not be arbitrated
under Japanese law; or (7) if the arbitration process or award is

15. See Alexander v. Blue Cross of California, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
16. There are no provisions in the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993), the
California Code of Civil Procedure §1286.2 (1982), the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules §
7511 (1998), nor in the 2003 Japanese Arbitration Act that provide for judicial review of errors of
fact or law.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 10(1993).
18. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993); CAL. CODE. CIV, PROC. § 1286.2
(1982); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b) (1998).
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contrary to public order.19 The Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association are totally silent on this
issue. As can be observed, the Japanese statute looks exclusively at
procedural matters, and does not address any evidentiary issues, as do
the various United States rules.
Anecdotal evidence and a review of appellate cases indicate that
unjust arbitration awards almost invariably result from the arbitrator's
errors of law or fact.2" The law of both Japan and the United States
deem that an enforceable arbitration contract divests the civil courts of
jurisdiction, but the law also holds that arbitration procedure is
governed by statutes that are strictly construed and applied.21 These
statutes, which are designed to expedite the process and reduce
expenses, do not include judicial review of the award for errors of fact
or law; thus, ipso facto precluding judicial review of the award. The
judiciary, various state legislatures, the Congress of the United States,
and the Diet in Japan, it may be reasonably concluded, have
deliberately chosen to sacrifice justice in the interests of time and
money.22
19. In addition to the following provisions, paragraphs 50 through 55 provide for criminal
penalties against the arbitrators for corruption and bribery. See Japan Arbitration Act, 2003
(unpublished), ch. X, paras. 50-55 (draft on file with author) [hereinafter 2003 Japan Arbitration
Act]. As Ishida notes, these criminal provisions are unique to Japan. See Kyoko Ishida, Judicial
Control of Arbitration in Japan: Enforceability of Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards 17-18 (2003) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Washington School
of Law) (on file with author). Although the 2003 Arbitration Act does not directly tie
paragraphs 50 through 55 to the grounds for vacation of the award under these circumstances,
without doubt any such award would be vacated.
20. Errors of fact are usually based on the claim that the arbitrator unduly restricted
discovery as in Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th
Cir. 1987) (upholding arbitrator's order for a post-hearing psychiatric examination without
opportunity for cross-examination). Errors of law are based on the arbitrator's misinterpretation
of applicable law, as in Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp., 628
F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 783 (1980) (arbitrators ignored the contract
formation doctrine of contra proferentem that requires that any ambiguities in the contract are to
be construed against the drafter).
Anecdotal "evidence" is important in understanding arbitration cases for the simple reason
that due to the extremely limited grounds for appeal there is relatively little appellate case law
describing the extent and nature of arbitral misconduct.
21. In Japan, the 2003 Arbitration Act, chapter I, article 4, specifically provides that the
courts will not have jurisdiction to hear the case unless otherwise provided in the Act. 2003
Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. I, art. 4. In the United States, this is deemed to occur
based on the agreement of the parties to arbitrate.
22. It can be well argued that the American state legislatures and Congress have made this
choice by omitting these grounds to vacate the award. This point is weak; as it will be pointed
out below, there is no concrete legislative indication that the statutory grounds to vacate the
award are exclusive. As for Japan, given a much stricter adherence of the courts to the language
of statutes generally it would be unfair to take to task the Japanese judiciary with failure to
judicially expand the statute.
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II. IN ARBITRATION, SPEED AND ECONOMY OUTWEIGH JUSTICE

One of the most attractive aspects of arbitration is that a dispute
may be resolved much faster than in civil litigation. An arbitration
matter can be initiated in as short a time as it takes to choose the
arbitration panel, whereas litigation may take up to a year or much
more depending on the jurisdiction.
The other attractive
characteristic is that arbitration can be considerably less expensive
because there is far less discovery than is generally permitted in
litigation." When describing the essential nature of arbitration and
referring to it as authority for the courts' inability to correct even
egregious evidentiary, legal or procedural problems, the courts
repeatedly say that the process is designed for "simplicity, informality,
and expedition" 24 and that "judgment be swift and economical," 25 thus
precluding judicial review.
If speed and economy in dispute resolution is the primary
concern of the parties, then arbitration may be the preferred dispute
resolution method. However, if parties choose arbitration they must
recognize that they will be sacrificing many procedural and legal
safeguards. Arbitrators in the United States and Japan can, and
sometimes will, act as described, and even if a party has been severely
prejudiced, no appeal and no remedy is possible. It is important for
counsel to keep in mind the following observation by a judge when
discussing with a client a proposal to include an arbitration clause:
[O]ne of the worst positions an attorney can be in is to
recommend binding arbitration and then have to explain to a
bewildered (and angry) client an unexplainable adverse result
that cannot be remedied. Anecdotal stories abound where an
arbitrator has made an award contrary to the facts or the law.26
All dispute resolution processes, whether civil litigation in a
court of law, arbitration, or even mediation, are ultimately decided on
the quality of the facts that the parties can place before the judge,
23. For arbitrations in Japan, this lack of discovery is very similar to litigation within the
civil law litigation system. Although the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure was substantially
amended in 1996 (with some minor subsequent additions) to include some additional discovery
mechanisms, extensive discovery as in the United States is not permitted. Hence, a Japanese
party would accept this as normal, whereas an American party would doubtless take this as a
serious impediment.
24. Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995).
25. Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26. Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (Nott, J., dissenting) (citing Deborah Rosenthal, Scammed?, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Aug.
2001, at 40).
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arbitrators, or mediators. In litigation, discovery mechanisms can
assure the parties that even though the discovery process may be
expensive, the process assures the parties that most of the relevant
facts will be discovered and can be presented to the court. This is
certainly not true in arbitration. Indeed, the primary raison d'etre for
27
the arbitration system is to eliminate as much discovery as possible.
None of the various American Arbitration Association rules or
statutes provides for any guarantee of discovery beyond arbitrators
requiring parties to produce a list of witnesses and documents they
intend to rely on in the arbitration.2 8 In Japan, under both the original
1890 Code and the 2003 Amendments to the arbitration law there is
no statutory right to any discovery whatsoever, with the sole exception
of the right to receive the documents and evidence the opposing party
submits to the arbitrators. 29 This limitation of discovery is touted as
one of the best aspects of arbitration in that it saves the parties
considerable expense." There is no question but that it does, but
there is a heavy price to pay.
A. Limitations on Discovery
One feature of arbitration that reduces costs is the severe
limitation on discovery. Indeed, it is the cost of discovery that caused
the alternative dispute resolution movement to gain popularity."
However, a brief reflection on this issue should cause the parties to
pause and consider the ramifications of their ability to conduct very
limited discovery after a dispute arises. No party can possibly know
all of the relevant facts in a case at the time the arbitration demand is
filed, particularly if the opposing party actively hides them. 2 Under
27. The goal of a swift economic arbitration process that virtually eliminates the parties'
ability to discover the relevant facts is in perpetual tension with the obvious necessity of
discovery to enable the parties to put all the relevant facts before the arbitrator. It is most
improbable that a party will have all the relevant facts at its disposal before the dispute arises,
and in arbitration it will be virtually impossible to discover them regardless of how critical they
are to the just resolution of the case.
28. See, e.g., CAL. CODE. CIv. PROC. § 1282.2(a)(2)(A) (1982). Note, however, in the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993), there is no such specific mandate.
29. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 32(4) requires that a party
disclose to the other party all such documents and evidence at the time of the submission of their
statement of the claim. This, however, can hardly be termed discovery. As will be described
infra, all discovery in Japan is by grace of the arbitrators: the parties may not demand it as a
matter of right.
30. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Cal. 1976).
31. Seeid. at 1182-83.
32. Where fraud or bad faith is a cause of action, without aggressive common law type
discovery it may be impossible to obtain the evidence to support such a claim, as evidence must
be extracted from the party whom, presumably, was deceitful throughout the entire business
relationship.
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the Federal Arbitration Act,33 there are no provisions regarding
discovery whatsoever, but case law holds that the documents a party
intends to rely on must be timely produced. 4
In California,
arbitrators are obliged to order the parties to disclose their witnesses
and documents,3" and arbitrators must also order the parties to make
the documents available to opposing parties in a timely manner.3 6 In
New York, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules make no
mention of any duty of the arbitrators to order document production
or to approve of any other discovery mechanisms.37
Consequently, if the arbitration is held under state law in New
York or California, neither California nor New York provides other
means for discovering facts that the parties may use as a matter of
right.
The parties cannot propound interrogatories or conduct
depositions without the express approval of the arbitrators, and
approval will usually be denied as such discovery is inimical to the
goals of the arbitration process.3" If a party does not have all of the
relevant facts they need to know to arbitrate the matter at the
commencement of the arbitration, that party cannot force the
arbitrators to allow discovery from the opposing party absent "special
circumstances," which do not include the normal requirements for
litigation.39 Absent these special circumstances, the refusal of the
arbitrator to allow discovery will not be subject to judicial review or

33. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003). And note, the Federal Arbitration Act is applied generally to
transnational arbitration contracts. Id.
34. In Chevron Transport Corp. v. Astro Vencedor Compania Naviera S.A., 300 F. Supp.
179, 180 (S.D.N.Y 1969), Chevron moved to set the award aside on the basis that the arbitrators
"refused to order timely production of the port logs [the ship's official record of all acts regarding
the ship while in the port]." Chevron obtained the logs (in Greek) after the hearings were closed
and only four days before the deadline for the submission of the briefs (in English). Id. at 180.
The Court held as follows: "The absence of statutory provisions for discovery techniques in
arbitration proceedings obviously does not negate the affirmative duty of arbitrators to insure
that relevant documentary evidence in the hands of one party is fully and timely made available
to the other side." Id. at 181. Failure to do so would mandate a vacation of the award under 9
U.S.C. § 10. Id. As discussed infra subsection II.A.1, discovery that is allowed will be severely
limited in scope under the "exceptional circumstances" rule.
35. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1282.2(a)(2)(A) (1982).
36. Id. § 1282.2(a)(2)(C).
37. N.Y. C.P.L.R., art. 75 (1998).
38. See generally Application of Katz, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
39. See Penn. Tanker Co. of Delaware v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, Warszawa, 199 F. Supp. 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). There will be no "judicially imposed and controlled discovery as to the merits
of a controversy ... except, perhaps, upon a showing of true necessity because of an exceptional
situation...." Id. at 718.
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vacation of the award, even if relevant evidence is rendered
unavailable.4"
The benchmark case for the federal rule that arbitrators control
the scope of discovery is Commercial Solvents Corp. v. LouisianaLiquid
Fertilizer Co.4 In Commercial Solvents, a party sought approval for
depositions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3), which the
arbitrator denied.42 The reviewing court held that arbitration's "'main
object' [is the] the avoidance of formal and technical preparation of a
case ...for trial. '4 3 The Commercial Solvents court went on to
conclude that "[t]he fundamental differences between the fact-finding
process of a judicial tribunal and those of a panel of arbitrators
demonstrate the need of pre-trial discovery in the one and its
superfluity and utter incompatibility in the other."44 The Commercial
Solvents court stated that arbitrators could accept hearsay, make
decisions against the weight of the evidence, make decisions that
needed no support form the evidence, and rely on their personal
In other words, the court advanced a non-sequitur
knowledge.
rationale for the rule that discovery is to be curtailed in arbitration;
that is, that the arbitrators can exercise their imperium pretty much as
they please.
1. The Special Circumstances Rule
The rather restrictive rule of Commercial Solvents is relaxed
somewhat under the federal and New York "special circumstances"
rule. Under this judicially created rule, arbitrators are required to
allow discovery "where a party's ability to properly present its case to
the arbitrators will be irreparably harmed absent court ordered
The very narrow scope of this doctrine is well
discovery."46
demonstrated in Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Services, Ltd.4 7
40. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir 1980) (holding that the parties in
arbitration "relinquish the right to certain procedural niceties.... One of these accoutrements is
the right to pre-trial discovery.").
41. 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
42. Id. at 360-61.
43. Id. at 360.
44. Id. at 362.
45. This reasoning justifying the lack of discovery is common, but unacceptable. There is
no possibility that any of the reasons cited would enable a party to discover facts relevant to the
action known by one party but unknown and otherwise unknowable to the other party. For
example, if the dispute involves allegations of faulty or negligent manufacture of goods that are
not in conformance with contract specifications, the factual reasons for the manufacturing of the
non-conforming goods may only be discovered from data in the possession of the opposing party.
46. Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 125 F.R.D. 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
47. 386 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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and Bigge Crane and Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp.48 In Bergen, the
defendant contracted to provide a crew for the plaintiffs ship and
certain controversies arose as to living conditions on board.49 Bergen
then sought leave to depose the crew on the basis that the ship was
about to depart U.S. territorial waters."0 Once the crewmen left the
United States, obtaining their live testimony at the hearing would be
difficult and costly. The Bergen court ordered the deposition to go
forward, stating:
Moreover, the Court does not view with favor an attempt [to
prevent the defendant's deposition] to achieve a result which
would not only be wasteful but would also suppress evidence
which, because the seamen who were deposed have since become
dispersed, might, as a practical matter, never again be
available."1
In Bigge, the defendant refused to pay for work that was done
and refused to indicate why it would not pay. 2 The plaintiff moved
for a court order compelling the deposition of the defendants under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and moved to postpone the
arbitration hearings if necessary. 3 The Bigge court ordered limited
discovery to enable the plaintiff to discover the reasons the defendant
refused to pay. 4 The court reasoned that the arbitration hearings
would not be delayed by conducting the discovery and the cost of the
depositions were minor compared to the amount in controversy.5 5 It
should be noted that the Bigge court indicated that any discovery for
the convenience of the plaintiff, that is discovery that would have
normally been done in civil litigation, was not allowed. 6
The definition of "exceptional circumstances" as "situations
where a party's ability to properly present its case to the arbitrators
will be irreparably harmed absent court ordered discovery"" could
authorize wider discovery in almost all cases, but it will not. Taken as
a whole, cases allowing limited discovery are clearly on the very edge
where the parties asking for discovery know virtually nothing about
the opposing party's position, as in Bigge, or where the witness with
48. 371 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y 1973).
49. Bergen, 386 F. Supp. at 431.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 435.
52. 371 F. Supp. at 242-43.
53. Id. at 242.
54. Id. at 246.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 125 F.R.D. 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (citing Falcone Bros. P'ship v. Bear Stearns & Co., 699 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 27:659

information is not a party and a deposition was ordered to preserve
their testimony, as in Bergen. Consequently, a party considering
arbitration must assume that there will be no discovery beyond the
production of documents the opposing party intends to rely upon.
These, naturally, will be of little if any utility in challenging the
opposing party's claim and of no assistance whatsoever in establishing
5s
a claim against the opposing party.
2. Japanese Discovery in Arbitration
Obtaining discovery in Japan under the Arbitration Act 9 is
somewhat different from obtaining discovery under the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association,
with the former resulting in less discovery. Parties are free to conduct
whatever independent investigation they please with cooperative third
parties, but opposing-party or coerced discovery is very much
curtailed.6" In order to obtain documents or to preserve a witness'

58. The unfettered discretion of the arbitrators to accept evidence that violates all
established evidentiary and procedural rules may lead to inequitable results. If a party refuses to
make discovery the arbitrator has unreviewable power to sanction, or refuse to sanction, the
truculent party's refusal to make discovery. In the hearing the arbitrators may admit the
evidence the party refused to produce, and this will not be a basis to vacate the award. Alexander
v. Blue Cross of California, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). In Alexander, the
arbitrator allowed Alexander to propound interrogatories and requests for admissions, which
Blue Cross did not respond to in a timely manner. Id. at 434. The arbitrator then ordered Blue
Cross to respond without objection, but refused to hold the requests for admission admitted as
required in a court of law under C.C.C.P. § 2003(k). Id. In the event a party refused to make
discovery, based on the arbitrator's unfettered discretion in admitting all arguably relevant
evidence (see infra, Section B, Admissibility and Reception of Evidence), the arbitrator's so doing
would most likely be immune from judicial review, much less a basis to set aside the award.
In one arbitration in which the author participated, during the discovery phase one party
refused to produce any documents on multiple issues stating on the record that the subject
matter of each issue was irrelevant. In the hearing, however, in violation of the arbitrators' prior
order that all documents the parties intended to use in the hearing were to be disclosed, that
party introduced into evidence literally hundreds of documents regarding the issues it claimed on
the record to be irrelevant to support its case-in-chief. This also violated the arbitrators' prior
ruling that all documentary evidence a party intended to rely on was to be disclosed to the
opposing party prior to the hearings. Nonetheless, the arbitrators allowed all the evidence in
over repeated objections on various grounds including failure to make discovery, estoppel,
surprise and the inability to prepare cross-examination, and violation of the arbitrators'
evidentiary ruling. The arbitrators then based their award in favor of the party who refused to
produce the evidence on that very evidence. This tactic of sandbagging and ambuscade would
never have been tolerated in a court of law. The author believes this experience was an anomaly,
but counsel and parties contemplating arbitration should be aware that this can occur, and if it
does there is no remedy.
59. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, arts. 34-35.
60. In the 2003 Act, there is nothing outside of subsections 32(4), (5) that require that a
party disclose all documents it intends to rely on in the hearings. Id. art. 32. Article 10 of the
2003 Act provides that the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure also be used in arbitration, but it is
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testimony 6' (including expert witnesses), the party must first seek
permission from the arbitrators. 62 If the arbitrators decide that the
sought after information is relevant and necessary, the arbitrators or
the party must then apply to the district court that has in personam
jurisdiction over the witness or the custodian of the documents, and
the court will conduct the discovery. 63 It is important to note that the
judge and the arbitrator will question the witness and examine the
evidence, not the parties.64 Consequently, under Japanese law
discovery is very limited and the discovery that is available is subject
to the approval of both the arbitrators and the court. As in the United
or the courts
States, there is no remedy if either the arbitrators
65
improperly refuse to assist in the discovery process.
There is the possibility that, under the new 2003 Arbitration
Act, the parties may petition the court through the arbitrators to
conduct additional discovery as permitted in the Japanese Code of
Civil Procedure.66 Assuming this is a correct interpretation, the
additional discovery is, compared to the practice in the United States,
quite inadequate. 67 Common law interrogatories, with sanctions for a
failure to respond, are only approximated in the Japanese Civil Code,
which permits the parties to submit "inquiries" to each other.6 8
very doubtful that this article intends to include the additional discovery that is available in civil
cases. Id. ch. I, art. 10.
61. American counsel must note that this provision for witness examination is not the
equivalent by any means of common law type discovery. These witnesses are direct witnesses
only, whose testimony is more similar to the common law practice of preserving testimony for
trial, not for furthering discovery purposes.
Because of the vague language in article 213 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure there is
the possibility that the parties may be able to have the court conduct other discovery besides
document production and preservation of witness testimony similar to that in civil litigation.
MINJI SOSHOSHO [M1NSOHO] art. 213 (Japan). However, the author believes that this is unlikely
to occur in practice.
62. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. 5, art. 35(2) states, "A party who files a
motion under the preceding paragraph [for the court to conduct the discovery] must obtain the
consent of the arbitral tribunal." Under the Japanese Arbitration Association Rules, rule 36
provides for the same procedure. The Japan Commercial Association, Commercial Arbitration
Rules, ch. IV, § 1, R. 36(1)(2) (on file with author) [hereinafter Japan Commercial Arbitration
Rules].
63. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 35(3).
64. See id. In civil litigation practice attorneys for the parties do actively participate in the
examination of witnesses, and it is probable that the parties in arbitration invoking this provision
would also participate.
65. See id. art. 35.
66. Id. art. 35(1); MINSOHOart. 163.
67. This interpretation is suspect because subsection (5) provides that the court, and not
the arbitrator, is to conduct the discovery under article 35. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra
note 19, art. 35(5). Moreover, this would be time consuming and directly involve courts in the
pre-hearing activities, which would be inimical to the basic concept of arbitration.
68. MINPO [Japanese Civil Code] art. 163 (Japan).
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Moreover, the statutory limitations on the scope of the questions seem
to negate their usefulness. The questions (i) must be particular; (ii)
cannot insult or embarrass; (iii) cannot be duplicative; (iv) cannot elicit
an opinion; (v) cannot require undue expense or time to answer; and
(vi) cannot involve a statutory privilege not to testify.69 While (iii),
(iv) and (v) appear reasonable, questions touching on the other
grounds (particularly subsection (iv)) would be very easy to evade.
There are no provisions providing effective sanctions for a party's
failure to respond or for a party's inadequate response.
With the exception of depositions (not available in Japan except
for the preservation of witness testimony under Code of Civil
Procedure article 234), one of the most effective litigation techniques
in the United States is the ability of a party to compel the production
of documentary evidence with severe sanctions in the event the
opposing party does not comply. 7 This is not the case in Japan. In
Japan a party may request that the opposing party produce
documentary evidence. 71 The responding party cannot refuse to
produce the document if it is in their possession and the party
requesting it has a legal right to it, or if the document was drafted for
the benefit of the requesting party.72 However, if the document is
related to a statutory privilege, or if the "document is in the possession
of the holder for the sole use of the holder" (moppara bunsho no
shojisha no riy6 ni kyosuru tame no bunsho) it is exempt from
production.73
If the party refuses to produce a document, the requesting party
may make a motion to compel the production of the document, and
must identify the document, provide the gist of the document, identify
the holder of the document, identify the fact or facts to be proved by
the document, and state the grounds for the holder to produce it.74 In
the event the requesting party cannot identify the document or give
the gist of it, the requesting party may be able to sufficiently identify
the document in a hearing thereby enabling the responding party to
69. Id.
70. An effect of this is illustrated by the Ford Motor Company's required disclosure of
highly damaging documents in the Ford Pinto product liability case. See Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 369-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
71. MINSOHOart.219.
72. Id. art. 220.
73. Id. art. 220(d). This provision, apparently based on German law notions of protecting
the privacy of third parties and not allowing a party's own documents to be used to attack that
party, nullifies the efficacy of most of the document production scheme. The most obvious
example is that under this rule all internal corporate documents would be non-discoverable
simply by virtue of the fact that they are for corporate use.
74. MINSOHO art. 221.
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produce it.7" If the responding party refuses to produce the document
pursuant to a court order, the court may deem the requesting party's
allegations as to the contents of the document to be true.76
As can be seen, the ability of the parties in Japan to obtain
documents is limited as to the scope of the documents a party may
request is very narrow. Moreover, the party must have some general
idea as to the nature of the document. Without this knowledge, it will
be impossible, even under the relaxed rules in article 222 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, to procure relevant documents of which the party
might not be aware, or simply cannot "sufficiently" identify. More
importantly, any document that "is solely for the sake of the use of the
holder" is exempt from discovery. 7 This exemption is not only
susceptible to abuse by the parties,78 but could prevent an opposing
party from gathering critical evidence that would support its claim.
Taken together, these structural aspects of Japanese document
production make the process problematic at best.
3. Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses Permitting Discovery
A partial solution to the limited amount of statutory discovery in
the United States and Japan is to include provisions that specifically
detail the amount and scope of discovery the parties feel comfortable
with in the event of a dispute in the arbitration agreement. 7 ' There are
no reported cases directly on point, but there is little doubt that in the
United States such a provision should be enforced as a matter of
75. Id. art. 222.
76. Id. art. 224.
77. Id. art. 220(iv)(c).
78. Such as a self-serving interpretation that the document was for internal use, which is
much like the tobacco producing corporation's routine strategy in the United States of labeling
sensitive correspondence and scientific data indicating the health hazards of tobacco
consumption as attorney work product to protect it from discovery.
79. The discovery provisions must be clear and unambiguous. Even so, if the arbitrator
"misinterprets" the discovery provision and refuses to allow discovery as contemplated by the
arbitration agreement, the arbitrator's ruling is not reviewable, nor will it be a basis to vacate the
award. Employer's Ins. Co. of Wasau v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, 933 F.2d 1481,
1485-86 (9th Cir. 1991).

In Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), the Court stated as follows:
The more enthusiastic of those sponsors [of arbitration] have thought of arbitration as
a universal panacea. We doubt whether it will cure corns [calluses on the feet due to
ill-fitting shoes] or bring general beatitude [a universal state of harmony and bliss in
the world following the Second Coming of Christ]. Few panaceas work as well as
advertised. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 987
n.32 (2d Cir. 1942) .... Arbitration sometimes involves perils that surpass the 'perils
of the seas.'
20 F.R.D. at 361 n.4. The lack of any effective discovery is one of those perils.
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simple contract law. In California, Mercuro v. Superior Court80 was an
employment discrimination case where the arbitration agreement
included provisions limiting discovery to "30 discovery requests,"
including three depositions. 8' The enforceability of the stipulated
discovery was not challenged, and the court appears to accept the
validity of the discovery provisions as a matter of course. However,
as a cautionary note, Mercuro was arbitrated pursuant to the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act, under which California courts
hold that additional discovery is allowed in arbitrations.83 As for
standard commercial arbitration, the universal acknowledgment that
arbitration agreements are contracts would tend to compel the
conclusion that the arbitrator would have to allow whatever additional
discovery is stipulated in the arbitration agreement. Nonetheless, if
the arbitrator refuses to order the contractually stipulated discovery, a
reviewing court might uphold the arbitrator because expanded
discovery is not specifically sanctioned by any of the rules or statutes
and is inherently inimical to the "speedy and inexpensive" arbitration
system.84

In Japan, oddly enough, a provision for contractual discovery
might be possible under the 2003 Japan Arbitration Act ("2003 Act")
even though there are no Code sections that expressly permit any type
of common law discovery. The 2003 Act states that the parties are
free to determine the procedure followed by the arbitral tribunal, as
long as it does not offend public policy.8 5 This would appear to allow
the parties to include a contractual provision calling for more extensive
discovery. If the arbitrators refuse to allow a contractual agreement
for discovery, the award might be vacated on the basis that the
80. 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
81. Id. at 683 (plaintiff objected to the limited amount of stipulated discovery, claiming
that it was insufficient to enable him to prove his case).
82. See id. In addition, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.1(b) provides that
"[olnly if the parties by their agreement so provide, may the provisions of section 1283.05
[regarding depositions] be incorporated into, made a part of, or made applicable to, any
arbitrations agreement." Note, however, that this statutory provision that allows the parties to
take depositions if they so agree does not explicitly include other discovery mechanisms such as
interrogatories and requests for admissions.
In Alexander, the parties included both
interrogatories and requests for admissions and the enforceability of these were never even
discussed. 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
83. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psych-Care Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 760 (Cal. 2000).
84. These are the general arguments the courts cite when disallowing the contractual
expansion of judicial review as discussed at length below. See also Moncharsh v. Heily and
Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
85. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 26(1). It is highly unlikely that
contractual discovery would violate public policy as this standard requires an act that is against
the fundamental mores and conventions of society (shakai kannen) or is an affront to public
morals.
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arbitrators failed to comply with the express provisions of the
arbitration agreement.8 6 However, it is also reasonable to expect that a
motion to vacate would be opposed on the basis that no such discovery
is allowed in civil cases. Therefore, the provision could be construed
as contrary to the law and expressly excluded.87 The resolution of this
issue must await judicial determination.
To summarize, if the arbitration is to occur in either the United
States or Japan, and a party can be sure that it will have all the
necessary facts and documentation it may need before the
commencement of the arbitration, arbitration may be a viable option.
If there is the possibility that the party will not have all, or at least
most, of the evidence it will need to arbitrate a potential dispute, that
party should reconcile itself to the probability that without such a
contractual stipulation it will never get the necessary discovery.
B. Admissibility and Reception of Evidence
All of the American arbitration statutes at issue in this article
provide that the arbitrator shall determine the relevancy and
admissibility of the facts offered by the parties, and that the usual
rules of evidence will not apply.88 These provisions are similar to
those in Japan, where the Arbitration Act provides that in the absence
of a contrary agreement of the parties, "the power of the tribunal
includes the power to determine the admissibility, necessity of
investigation and weight of the evidence."8 9 Consequently, as will be
seen in detail below, in the United States the arbitrators tend to admit
as evidence facts that no court would ever entertain, much less base a
decision upon. These loose rules of evidence are designed to allow the
86. Id. ch. VII, art. 44(1)(vi).
87. See id. Likewise, if the aggrieved party sought a court order compelling the additional
discovery while the arbitration is pending, the opposing party would doubtless raise the same
arguments. The author anticipates that such a discovery provision would be invalidated as
incompatible with the goals of arbitration and the lack of any such process in the Japanese Code
of Civil Procedure in litigation. However, until there is a definitive court decision, detailed
discovery provisions should be routinely included in the arbitration agreement.
88. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1282.2(c) (1982) ("The neutral arbitrator shall ... rule
on the admission and exclusion of evidence .. ");N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(c) (1998) (gives parties
the right to submit evidence, but the arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence). See
Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (N.Y. 1984).
This rule does not, however, imply that the arbitrators will in fact relax the rules of evidence.
In one arbitration the author was involved in, the arbitrators insisted on applying strict rules of
evidence (excluding hearsay) despite the fact that no such requirement was in the arbitration
agreement. Naturally, this improper demand of the arbitrators adversely impacted the parties'
preparation for the arbitration as they quite reasonably assumed that hearsay would be allowed
within limits.
89. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 26(3).
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parties to present evidence without undue worry about the formal
rules of evidence in order to facilitate the hearings, and to give the
arbitrator a general feel for the case. 9°
The problems regarding evidence that can arise from such rules
may cause the American party and counsel more conceptual difficulty
than they will Japanese parties. In Japan there is no comparable
"Evidence Code" or similar rules of evidence as in the United States,
except for several simple provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure
that provide that only relevant evidence will be admitted." As for
arbitrations in the United States, counsel must be aware that
arbitrators in the United States can admit evidence that is directly
contrary to what they have learned to be admissible and involve
activities they may even consider unethical. The following subsections are exemplary of common situations where evidence was
admitted in an arbitration that would not have been entertained in a
court of law.
1. Hearsay Evidence
Cases in American law are in accord that the arbitrators can
accept hearsay evidence as substantive proof of the matter asserted.92
The potential for mischief inherent in the acceptance of hearsay
evidence can result in unsubstantiated or unreliable evidence forming
the factual basis for the award, or even a completely unanticipated reordering of contractual obligations. A typical case is Farkas v.
Receivable Financing Corp.,"3 where the arbitrator allegedly exceeded
his power when he admitted both parole and hearsay evidence that
changed the contract language of an employment contract.94 The
challenge to this arbitral re-writing of the contract failed. 95 Under 9
U.S.C. § 10(d) and Virginia Code Ann. 8.01-581.010, the Court held
as follows:
90. Harvey Aluminum v. United Steelworkers of Am., 263 F. Supp. 488, 491 (C.D. Cal.
1967).
91. There is no Code section that puts it that precisely. The Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure art. 180(1) states that the evidence offered must specify the fact to be proven. Civil
Procedure Rule 99, on offering evidence, states, "Evidence shall be offered by clearly and
concretely indicating the relation between the facts to be proved and the evidence." MINJI SOSHO
KISOKU [Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure] art. 99. Under Civil Procedure Rule 114, the
questions put to witness must be "relevant to such matters" to be proved. Id. art. 114. And
under Civil Procedure Rule 115(2)(iv) the witness may not be asked questions that "are not
relevant to the point at issue." Id. art. 11 5(2)(iv).
92. See, e.g., Sapp v. Barenfeld, 212 P.2d 233, 238-39 (Cal. 1949). The formal rules of
evidence do not apply in arbitration, thus hearsay is allowed. Id.
93. 806 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Va. 1992).
94. Id. at 85.
95. Id. at 87.

2004] ContractualStipulation in United States-JapanArbitration

679

Arbitrators do not exceed their powers by admitting or
considering hearsay evidence. The A[merican] A[rbitration]
A[ssociation] rules... provide in pertinent [sic]: "The parties
may offer such evidence as is relevant and material to the
dispute and shall produce such evidence as the arbitrator may
deem necessary
to understanding and determination of the
96
dispute."
Hearsay "evidence" by its nature is difficult if not impossible to
challenge as the one asserting the statement is not available for crossexamination; the reason, of course, why hearsay is not admissible in a
court of law.97 As Farkas illustrates, if the arbitrators modify the
contractual obligations of a party at the time of the arbitration hearing
(either sua sponte based on a clearly erroneous interpretation of the
contract or based on erroneous hearsay evidence), the injured party is
placed in a position where their best good faith efforts to comply with
the original contract obligations have been nullified.
As for the law regarding hearsay in Japan, there is no equivalent
to the common law rule in the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure.
However, a witness may not be asked a question that "is related to a
fact that the witness has not experienced directly."98 Although the
2003 Act specifically states that the Code of Civil Procedure will apply
to all arbitration proceedings,99 the 2003 Act does not indicate that the
arbitrators or the arbitration process is subject to the Civil Procedure
Rules. Regardless, the arbitrators have the statutory power to conduct
the hearings as they see fit and to "determine the admissibility,
necessity of investigation and weight of any evidence."'0 °
2. Ex parte Communications
The acceptance of ex parte communications may have the same
disruptive effect, leading to an unjust arbitration procedure, as the
admission of hearsay evidence. In the United States, the arbitrators'
ex parte communication with the parties themselves, while absolutely
forbidden in civil litigation, is not a basis to set an arbitration award

96. Id.
97.

See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(b) (1995).

The primary reasons for the non-

admission of hearsay is that such statements are not under oath and there is no cross
examination. See generally People v. Durarte, 12 P.3d 1110 (Cal. 2000).
98. Japanese Civil Procedure Rule 15(2)(vi) (properly understood as a restatement of the
common law rule). MINI SOSHO KISOKU art. 15(2)(vi).
99. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 17, ch. I, art. 10.
100. Id. ch. V, art. 26(2)-(3).
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aside.'' Also, ex parte communication with third parties is not
considered misconduct in arbitration, and will not be a basis to vacate
the award even if the information was critical in the arbitrators'
decision. 1 2 In Sapp v. Barenfeld, 10 3 a building construction dispute,
the arbitrator solicited construction cost information from a third
source outside of the hearing without the presence or knowledge of the
parties, precluding cross-examination and rebuttal. 4 The Court held
that "[t]here is no error in such a procedure."' 5 In American Almond
Products Co. v. ConsolidatedPecan Sales Co., 106 involving the breach of
a contract for the sale of pecans, the parties failed to include adequate
price data in the briefs or hearing, so the arbitrator sought it
elsewhere."' Judge Learned Hand held that this was permissible,
stating, "... . [the parties] may not hedge [the arbitration] about with

limitations which it is precisely its purpose to
those procedural
avoid."' ' °
In Japan, the 2003 Act requires arbitrators to give all the parties
sufficient notice of the time and place if they intend to inspect
documents or take the testimony of witnesses.0 9 However, it should
be noted that the 2003 Act also provides that arbitrators are obligated
to give the parties copies of documents or other evidence "that forms
the basis for the arbitral award," but this section does not indicate that
the documents or other evidence must be submitted to the parties at
the same time the arbitrators receive it."0 In arbitrations conducted
under the Japan Commercial Arbitration Rules the arbitrators have
considerably more power. The arbitrators may "examine evidence
that a party has not applied to present," but if they do so, "[s]uch
examination of evidence may be made other than at a hearing." 1 If
the arbitral tribunal decides to examine evidence other than at' a
hearing, "the parties shall be given the opportunity to be present. 12
101. Case law holds that ex parte communications with a party will not be a basis for
setting an award aside, if the arbitrators deny it had any influence on the decision. Barcume v.
City of Flint, 132 F. Supp. 2d 549, 555-58 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
102. Id. at 557-58.
103. 212 P.2d 233 (Cal. 1949).
104. Id. at 236.
105. Id. at 238.
106. 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944).
107. Id. at 450.
108. Id. at 451.
109. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 32(3).
110. Id. art. 32(5). There is no comparable provision in the 1890 Arbitration Code; thus, it
is unknown if in practice the arbitrators would be required to disclose that information in a
timely manner to the parties.
111. Japan Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 62, ch. IV, § 1, R. 35(2), (3).
112. Id. R. 35(3).
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However, "[t]he arbitral tribunal may, when it deems it necessary or
when there has been a petition from a party, refer inquiries to, and
request responses from, public or private bodies." 113 The fact that the
rule goes on to state that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall disclose
responses thus obtained to the parties""' 4 clearly indicates that the
arbitrators may conduct the inquiry ex parte.
3. Lack of Cross-Examination
In the United States, because the arbitrators' refusal to accept
relevant evidence is a statutory ground to vacate the award, arbitrators
will usually err on the side of accepting a wide variety of evidence.
However, as can be surmised from the discussion above, the arbitrator
does not have to allow the parties to cross-examine a witness or
examine documentary evidence.'
Obviously, if arbitrators solicit
information ex parte from a third party the parties have been deprived
of any chance to conduct cross-examination." 6 If the arbitrators'
decision is based on their opinion that cross-examination is not
necessary, the lack of any cross-examination will not be deemed
misconduct and will not be grounds to set the award aside."'
As under American law, the 2003 Act contains no provisions
regarding a party's express right to cross-examine witnesses. The
most serious problem occurs when the court or arbitrators examine
witnesses or documents and there is no provision for the parties to
actively participate in the proceedings."' Moreover, as indicated
above in the discussion of Commercial Arbitration Rule 35(5), it is
clear that when the arbitrators conduct an ex parte inquiry of "public
or private bodies" there will be no opportunity for cross-examination
at the time of the inquiry." 9 It must be noted, however, that when the
arbitrators hold oral hearings under the 2003 Act 20 and Commercial
113. Id. R. 35(5).
114. Id.
115. See Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295-96
(9th Cir. 1987) (arbitrator determined that cross examination of a doctor who conducted a
medical exam was not necessary). The arbitrator's ability to declare that cross-examination is
not needed is directly in conflict with the idea that all possible evidence be admitted. It cannot
be reconciled, but may only be tentatively explained by the courts' consistent declaration that the
arbitrator has the sole power to determine what evidence is relevant or unnecessary. How the
arbitrator is to reach that conclusion without actually hearing the evidence is never explained.
116. See, e.g., Sapp v. Barenfeld, 212 P.2d 233, 236 (Cal. 1949); Am. Almond Products
Co. v. Consol. Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944).
117. Sunshine Mining Co. v United Steelworkers of America, 823 F.2d. 1289, 1295-96
(9th Cir. 1987).
118. See 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 35.
119. Japan Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 62, ch. 4, § 1, R. 35(5).
120. See 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 32(3).
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Arbitration Rules, 121 the arbitrators must give adequate notice of the
hearing in order to allow the parties to attend and participate. This
should not be confused with the problem of the arbitrators receiving
ex parte evidence without the parties' participation.
In the United States, the arbitrators' ex parte communication
with witnesses can even occur after the hearings are closed. In
Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,122 the employer
terminated an employee due to mental instability, behavioral
problems, and insubordination resulting from severe head trauma.23
The arbitrator ordered an independent medical evaluation after
closing the case to determine the prognosis of the claimant's
condition.'24 No cross-examination of the physician was allowed. 2 '
On motion to quash the physical examination, the Court held that the
lack of the petitioner's ability to cross-examine the doctor was not a
violation of its due process rights if the hearing was "fundamentally
fair."' 26 The Court, citing Ficek v. South Pacific Co., 2 ' then held that
a "fundamentally fair" hearing was one in which the parties had notice
28
of the action, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision.1
Thus, according to case law, when considering that private justice is a
goal of both arbitration and litigation, we may reach the inconsistent
conclusion that the lack of cross-examination will not affect the
fairness of an arbitral proceeding, but will be fatal in civil litigation.
4. Evidence of Settlement Negotiations or Mediation
Evidence concerning negotiations or mediations is an area that all
American and Japanese counsel representing clients contemplating an
arbitration agreement providing for arbitration in the United States
must be familiar with because it is counter intuitive to lawyers that
deal exclusively with American civil litigation. In civil litigation, all
settlement offers and mediation statements by the parties are, as a
121. See Japan Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 62, ch. 4, § 1, R. 35(3).
122. 823 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 1291.
124. Id. at 1292.
125. Id. at 1293.
126. Id. at 1295. See also Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516 Int'l
Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d
Cir. 1974).
127. 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 788 (1965).
128. Sunshine Mining, 823 F.2d at 1295. These elements of a supposedly "fundamentally
fair" arbitration process keep resurfacing when the courts are confronted with such problems.
The argument is specious on its face. In any one given case the elements for a "fair" hearing, as
narrowly defined by the courts, may be in place, but any such fairness can be eviscerated by any
number of matters that would not be tolerated in a court of law.
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matter of law, inadmissible for sound public policy reasons. 129 It is not
uncommon for the parties who find themselves in arbitration to have
engaged in prior mediation efforts wherein the parties may offer to
settle the case or otherwise make statements that are contrary to their
interests. The California Evidence Code states uncompromisingly as
follows:
Any reference to a mediation during any subsequent trial is an
irregularity in the proceedings of the trial for the purposes of
Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Any reference to a
mediation during any other subsequent noncriminal proceeding
is grounds for vacating or modifying the decision in that
proceeding, in whole or in part, and granting a new or further
hearing on all or part of the issues, if the reference materially
affected the substantive rights of the party requesting relief. 3 °
Needless to say, in the event an attorney is foolish enough to try
and introduce such evidence in a civil trial, in addition to a new trial,
judicial sanctions and professional censure would surely follow. This
doctrine is so well known that it simply would not occur to trial
counsel or corporate counsel to be concerned with it. However, if a
party does attempt to mediate a dispute and if there is a significant
possibility that the mediation will fail, sending the dispute into
arbitration, counsel must be aware that these statements may be
admitted and the award may be based on such statements. This
possibility exists because the formal rules of evidence do not apply,
and the arbitrator may admit those statements.131
In theory, arbitration has the same exclusionary rule with regard
to mediation statements as do civil actions. The California Code of
Civil Procedure provides that in international arbitrations the
confidentiality of conciliation statements is supposedly assured:
"Evidence of anything said or of any admission made in the course of
the conciliation is not admissible in evidence. ' 132 The Code goes on to
state: "In the event that (anything] is offered in contravention of this
section, the arbitration tribunal or the court shall make any order
which it considers to be appropriate ... including, without limitation,
129. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1128 (Supp. 2004).
130. Id.
131. Sapp v. Barenfeld, 212 P.2d 233, 238 (Cal. 1949). In one arbitration the author
participated in, opposing counsel attempted to introduce a mediator's written report that was
prejudicial to the author's client under circumstances that clearly indicated that opposing counsel
was fully aware he was violating California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1297.371. Although
the arbitrators did not accept the mediator's report into evidence, they refused to impose any
sanctions on opposing counsel. Nevertheless, the damage was done and there was no remedy.
132. § 1297.371 (2003).
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orders restricting the introduction of evidence, or dismissing the case
without prejudice."' 3
In practice, this statutory rule can be trumped by the doctrine
that the arbitrator is the judge of relevant evidence and the rule that
the arbitrator may chose to ignore any or all evidence and civil
procedural rules. 34 However, because there is no judicial review for
errors of law, the arbitrators can ignore this statute and accept
statements and documents made in mediation as evidence with
impunity. There are no California or New York cases directly on
point, but a case from Oklahoma is instructive.135 In Bowles, the
attorney for plaintiff "deliberately, intentionally, affirmatively and
repeatedly" introduced evidence regarding offers of settlement and
argued that all such offers constituted an admission of liability.' 6 The
arbitrators then gave the plaintiff an award higher than the defendant
offered in the mediation.' 37 Upon motion to set the award aside based
on the violation of a statute explicitly prohibiting such conduct, the
District Court expressed its dismay at the attorney's unprofessional
conduct, as did the Court of Appeals, but the award was nonetheless
ultimately upheld.'38
The Court of Appeals stated that "[a]rbitration provides neither
the procedural protections nor the assurance of the proper application
of substantive law offered by the judicial system."' 39 The Court went
on to note that "[o]ne choosing arbitration should not expect the full
panoply of procedural and substantive protection offered by a court of
law.""'14 The Court reluctantly justified letting the award stand,
stating that "[t]he rules of arbitration agreed to by the parties do not
explicitly condemn the communication of settlement offers to the
arbitrators.""' This was expanded upon in a footnote where the
Court stated as follows:
Within the procedural rules of arbitration, Bowles's counsel was
not bound by the condemnation of disclosure of settlement
offers found in the judicial rules of evidence. Had Bowles's
counsel done before a court of law what he did before the
133. Id.
134. Sapp, 212 P.2d at 239.
135. See Bowles Fin. Group v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994).
136. Id. at 1010. There is no indication in the reporter that defendant's attorney objected,
but based on the fact that the court's acceptance into evidence of the mediation statements was
the gravamen of the appeal, an objection must have been lodged. See id. at 1010-11.
137. Id. at 1011.
138. Id. at 1011, 1013-14.
139. Id. at 1011.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1013.
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arbitrators, significant sanctions would have been imposed and a
mistrial ordered. But however well-established may be the
judicial rules of evidence, they legitimately did not apply to this
arbitration.'42
The Court went on to conclude that where the hearing was
"fundamentally fair," that is if there was notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and an unbiased decision maker,'
the clearly improper
references to the mediation were not sufficient to vacate the award.144
To summarize, counsel must bear in mind and communicate to
their clients that in arbitration the opposing party may be able to
submit evidence of a prior mediation or other settlement efforts that
they could never do in litigation. Based on the doctrine that the
arbitrator, and not the evidence code, will determine the admissibility
of such evidence, it is most likely that California and New York, as
well as the federal courts, will follow Bowles and allow the arbitrator to
let such evidence in. This possibility alone may be an intolerable risk.
5. Improperly Excluded Evidence
Neither the original Japanese Arbitration Code nor the 2003 Act
contain provisions for the occurrence of improperly excluded
evidence. Thus, if Japanese arbitrators exclude relevant evidence,
there is no remedy. The 2003 Act sets forth the grounds upon which
an award may be vacated, and there is nothing in this section
regarding the arbitrator's refusal to accept relevant evidence.14 The
only possible provision under Japanese law that might apply is one
stating that the parties "shall be given a full opportunity to explain
their case during the arbitral proceedings. "146
Even so, if the
arbitrators or the courts refuse to assist in the production of evidence
as described above under section 35 of the Commercial Arbitration
Rules, which results in a deprivation of a party's right to fully present
their case under section 25 of the 2003 Act, there is no statutory
remedy and, therefore, no judicial review. The omission in the
142. Id. at 1012 n.1. This conclusion cannot stand any degree of scrutiny. The fact that
the arbitration statutes do not "explicitly" preclude such egregious misbehavior is no excuse for a
judicial sanction in arbitration, however reluctantly, of conduct that is in fact "explicitly"
prohibited by statute and is fatally prejudicial in civil litigation.
143. Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir.
1987).
144. Bowles, 22 F.3d at 1012. Note also that the Oklahoma statute on this issue is similar
to that of California. OKLA. STAT. 12 § 1824(6) (2003) ("No admission, representation,
statement or other confidential communication... shall be admissible."). And, such statements
or representations are not subject to discovery. Id.
145. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 25(2).
146. See id. ch. VII, art. 44.
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Japanese statute to include the refusal of the arbitrators to accept
evidence is remarkable.
In contrast, in the United States, the rule that the arbitrator's
refusal to hear relevant evidence will be grounds to vacate the award is
firmly established.'47 In the event the arbitrator refuses to postpone a
hearing to enable a party to acquire evidence, this too will be valid
grounds to vacate an award.' 48 In Robbins, the plaintiff claimed that
PaineWebber violated security regulations by unauthorized trading of
options, excessive trading, and "churning" certain stock to inflate the
price."' The arbitrator refused to accept critical evidence as to these
issues."' The Court held that when this occurs, judicial review will be
proper, but will be "severely limited"'' because of the public interest
in preserving the "efficiency of the arbitration process." 11S2 Citing
Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.," 3 the Court
held that it can "vacate an arbitrator's award.., only if the arbitrator's
refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices the rights of
the parties and denies them a fair hearing.""'
The arbitrator's power to control the presentation of evidence
can include the arbitrator's refusal to hear witnesses. In Harvey
Aluminum v. United Steelworkers of America,' an employee was
discharged on the allegation that he had damaged company property
during a strike. 6 The arbitrator refused to accept the testimony of an
exculpatory rebuttal witness because, in his opinion, the rebuttal
witness should have been a direct witness. 57 The reviewing court
upheld the arbitrator's decision based on the principle that the
arbitrator is the sole judge of the relevance of the proffered facts and

147. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir. 1992); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 (11th Cir. 1990).
148. 9 U.S.C. § 10(3) (1993).
149. Robbins, 954 F.2d. at 681.

150. Id. at 683.
151. Id. at 682.
152. Id. This conclusory declaration is a common one: that the speed and efficiency of the
arbitration is deemed to be of a higher societal value than that of a just resolution of the dispute.
This is an inherently flawed and irresponsible concept. For arbitration to be credible, it must
aspire to render justice, not merely provide a cheap resolution of the dispute. Indeed, Ishida
points out that the current Japanese reluctance to embrace arbitration is because arbitration is not
seen to be as reliable as litigation. See Ishida, supra note 19, at 4-5. The credibility of arbitration
in Japan, as well as in the United States, must rest on its ability to render justice, not justice
subverted by concerns of speed and economy.
153. 903 F.2d 1410, 1412, n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
154. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 685.
155. 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967).

156. Id. at 489.
157. Id. at 490.
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that "conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary."1"8
However, the ruling of the arbitrator had the effect of precluding
critical evidence and was deemed to violate California Code of Civil
Procedure 1286.2 and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(c)."5 9
The practical effect of the arbitral rules allowing a much broader
spectrum of evidence than is admissible in civil cases is often to
ultimately cause more problems than it solves. Unless the parties
stipulate in the clearest possible language in the arbitration agreement
that the civil rules of evidence will apply, there is no assurance that
these difficulties can be avoided. Even then, counsel and the parties
should be aware that the stipulation will not guarantee that the
arbitrator will abide by the provisions of the arbitration contract. If
the arbitrator makes a "mistake" in allowing in evidence not available
under the rules of evidence or in excluding ordinarily admissible
evidence, those mistakes will not be subject to judicial review, nor will
they be a basis to vacate the award.
C. Limited JudicialReview of the Award or Arbitral Process
1. Mistakes of Law and Fact
One of the most contentious areas of American arbitration law is
where the arbitrator makes gross errors of either law or fact and the
prejudiced party seeks to set the award aside. If such an error occurs,
there is generally no appeal or remedy, regardless of how severe the
prejudice. 6 ' Likewise, the Japanese 2003 Arbitration Amendments
contain no provisions for the vacation of the award when mistakes of
law or fact occur.'
American case law is unanimous that arbitrators' mistakes of law
or fact are not reviewable.' 62 The reasons are simple: the arbitration
statutes and rules provide specific grounds upon which the award may
16 3
be vacated and errors of law or fact are not amongst any of them.
The absence of such a provision is deemed to imply, even in the
absence of specific language, that the state legislatures and Congress
intended to exclude judicial review of the arbitration award for errors
158. Id. at 491.
159. Id. at 493-95.
160. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987).
161. See 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. VII, art. 44.
162. As described infra, the limited exceptions are the "manifest disregard of law" doctrine
under the Federal Arbitration Act and those federal circuits that recognize a contractual
stipulation for judicial review. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993).
163. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1286.2 (1982); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 7511(b) (1998).
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of law or fact. In Refino v. Feuer Transportation, Inc.,164 the Court
concluded that there can be no review for errors of fact or errors of law
because, under 9 U.S.C. § 10, "[t]hese grounds [to vacate the award]
do not include mistakes of fact, errors of law, inadequate reasoning or
even arbitrary determinations. ' 16S In the 1895 case of Patton v.
Gannett,166 the Court succinctly summed up the law and rationale that
is still in effect today as follows:
If an arbitrator makes a mistake either as to law or fact, it is the
misfortune of the party, and there is no help for it. There is no
right of appeal, and the court has no power to revise6 the
decisions of "judges who are of the parties' own choosing."' 1
Case law in California is in complete accord. As recently as
2002, in Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v. CC
Partners,168 the Court held that a reviewing court will never review the
sufficiency of the evidence, whether the arbitrator made any errors of
fact, or whether the arbitrator made any errors of law. 69 Regardless of
the prejudice to the party caused by the arbitrator's error of law or
fact, even if the error is on the face of the award, courts will not review
the award under any other7 basis than is provided for in the California
Code of Civil Procedure. 1
The benchmark California case on this issue is Moncharsh v.
Heily and Blase,' where an associate attorney left his law firm and
According to Moncharsh's
took several clients with him. 172
employment contract, should such an event occur, the law firm would
be entitled to 80 percent of the client's fees.' 73 Moncharsh attempted
to get the 80/20 fee structure declared invalid in arbitration and lost.'
However, the arbitrator did exclude one client from the 80/20 fee
formula who had only recently retained the firm and had gone with
Moncharsh. 7 1 Moncharsh appealed under California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1286.2 claiming that the arbitrator erred in his
interpretation of the employment contract. 176 Moncharsh's argument
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

480 F. Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Id. at 565.
21 S.E. 679 (N.C. 1895).
Id. at 682.
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
See id. at 370.
Alexander v. Blue Cross of Cal., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 901.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 901-02.
Id. at 902.
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was that the split fee agreement was contrary to public policy and,
moreover, that the agreement was contrary to the State Bar Rules and
case law.177 The Court held that there was no relief for a mistake or
misreading of the plain words of the contract, stating as follows:
In reaffirming this general rule, we recognize there is a risk that
the arbitrator will make a mistake. That risk, however, is
acceptable for two reasons. First, by voluntarily submitting to
arbitration, the parties have agreed to bear that risk in return for
a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive resolution to their
dispute.'78
The Court went on to justify this rule in language that is not
quite convincing:
[T]he Legislature has reduced the risk to the parties of such a
decision by providing for judicial review in circumstances
involving serious problems with the award itself, or with the
fairness of the arbitration process ....

In light of these statutory

provisions, the residual risk to the parties of an arbitrator's
erroneous decision represents an acceptable cost-obtaining the
expedience and financial savings that the arbitration process
provides-as compared to the judicial process."'
The underlying assumption in Moncharsh and similar cases
denying judicial review of errors of law under the Federal Arbitration
Act is that the various arbitration statutes do not specifically provide
for any such judicial review. Thus, courts reason, state legislatures and
Congress intended, by implication, to exclude judicial review for
errors of law or fact under any circumstances. The Moncharsh Court
cited the findings of a special commission constituted to study
proposed legislative revisions to the arbitration statute' 80 stating:
(2) Merits of an arbitration award either on questions of fact or
of law may not be reviewed except as provided in the statute in
the absence of some limiting clause in the arbitration agreement.
(5) Statutory provisions for a review of arbitration proceedings
are for the sole purpose of preventing misuse of the proceedings
where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error or mistake has

177. Id. at 901 (citing Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d. 9 (Cal. 1972)).
178. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 904.
179. Id. at 905.
180. California Law Revision Commission Recommendation and Study Relating to Arbitration,
3 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT G-1, G-5 to G-64 (1961).
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prejudice of a
been carried into the award to the substantial
81
party to the [arbitration] proceedings.'
Consequently, as the 1961 revision of the California arbitration
statute did not include any express provisions allowing courts to
vacate an award based on errors of law or fact, the Court held that
such a remedy was unavailable by implication.' 82 The better reasoned
dissent in Moncharsh notes that there is no indication in the California
statute or the legislative history that judicial review for errors of law or
fact was precluded.' 83 The dissent's reasoning is in conformance with
181. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 913 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
182. See id. at 914-16.
183. See id. at 920 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Judge Kennard, although agreeing with the
conclusion of the majority opinion, vehemently disagreed with the reasons, writing:
I cannot join the majority opinion. I will not agree to a decision inflicting on this
state's trial courts a duty to promote injustice by confirming arbitration awards they
know to be manifestly wrong and substantially unjust. Nor can I accept the
proposition, necessarily implied although never directly stated in the majority
opinion, that the general policy in favor of arbitration is more important than the
judiciary's solemn obligation to do justice .... Worst of all, the majority has forsaken
the goal that has defined and legitimized the judiciary's role in society-to strive
always for justice.
Id. Judge Kennard rejected the idea that the agreement to arbitrate included an agreement to
abide by "an award that on its face is manifestly erroneous and results in substantial
injustice.... [This] conclusion defies both logic and experience. Reasonable contracting parties
would never assume a risk that is so unnecessary and self-destructive." Id.
Judge Kennard indicates that in pre-code common law arbitration the arbitrators were not
obliged to follow the law, but if they did, or were to do so under the arbitration agreement the
court would review for errors of law and vacate the award. Id. at 921 (citing Muldrow v. Norris,
2 Cal. 74 (1852)).
The judge then reviewed the benchmark case Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 260 P.2d 156 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1953), which held that the statutory scheme was exclusive. The Crofoot Court held
that, "Under the law as it presently exists there is no field for a common law arbitration to
operate where the agreement to arbitrate is in writing." 260 P.2d at 169. The Crofoot Court
went on to hold:
The effectiveness, operation and enforcement of a common law arbitration differ in
almost every respect from a statutory arbitration. We conclude that by the adoption
of the 1927 statute, the Legislature intended to adopt a comprehensive all-inclusive
statutory scheme applicable to all written agreements to arbitrate, and that in such
cases the doctrines applicable to a common law arbitration were abolished.... Under
these cases [as cited above] it must be held that in the absence of some limiting clause
in the arbitration agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or of
law, may not be reviewed except as provided by statute.
260 P.2d at 169, 172.
The Crofoot Court does not explain how, outside of the statute, it found that the common law
rule was expressly expunged. Judge Kennard notes that there is no reference in Crofoot to the
accepted common law judicial review for legal error under Muldrow, and he notes that the statute
does not indicate it is exclusive. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 922. Finally, the judge refers to the
1960 Commission that stated, "Nothing in the California statute defines the permissible scope of
And no good reason exists to codify into the California statute the case
review by the courts ....
law as it presently exists." Id. at 923. Judge Kennard best summarized his position when he
stated as follows:
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the fundamental common law doctrines that statutes are to be strictly
and that
construed according to the express language of the statute
184
implied statutory rules are disfavored in interpretation.
The harsh rule that errors of law or fact may never be reviewed
by the courts certainly cannot withstand critical scrutiny as this rule
often results in substantial injustice. The Federal and New York
courts have recognized this failure in particularly serious cases.
Where the arbitrators have egregiously ignored the law or85facts the
courts have the obligation to step in and set the award aside.
a. The Limits of the Federal "Manifest Disregardof Law or Fact"
Doctrine
The federal courts, despite consistently holding that the only
grounds for vacation of an award were solely within the statute,
recognize that justice cannot be served and confidence in the
arbitration system cannot be maintained if the arbitrators exercise
their imperium in ways that are legally and socially unacceptable.
Thus, in an attempt to place at least some limits on arbitrators, courts
created the "manifest disregard of law or fact" doctrine, which,
incidentally, has no statutory basis in either Federal or New York
law.'

86

Where the arbitrators render an award that is "completely
irrational" the arbitrators will be deemed to have exceeded their
powers and the award will be vacated. 7 Simple error of interpreting
the law, no matter how bad, however, will not be grounds to vacate the
award.' 88 Under this concept, even if the parties present a correct
interpretation or statement of the law and the arbitrators determine, in
gross error, that the legally correct interpretation or statement is not
accurate or applicable, that mistake will not be sufficient grounds for
the court to vacate the award.

Because the relevant statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, does not say in
so many words that an arbitration award may be challenged for obvious error causing
substantial injustice, the majority concludes that a court may not vacate an award on
this ground. But this conclusion is wrong. Our statute does not, by negative
implication or otherwise, mandate injustice.
Id. at 922.
184. Id. at 920.
185. This raises the interesting philosophical question as to just how much error may be
tolerated before the courts will intervene.
186. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (1998).
187. Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 (1977).
188. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987).
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The manifest disregard of law doctrine originated in obscure
dicta in Wilko v. Swan,'89 which raised the issue of whether a claim
under the Securities Act of 1933 could be arbitrated. The Wilko
Court held that the claim could not be arbitrated. 9 ' The Court began
by noting that the Securities Act mandated certain judicial and legal
standards in litigating this statutory claim, and went on to hold that
the "burden of proof' and the determination of "reasonable care" and
"material fact(s)" under these claims were more stringent than those
standards in arbitration proceedings. 9 '
Because there was no
requirement for a record in arbitrations, there was no possible way for
reviewing courts to determine whether the arbitrators complied with
the statutory requirements or whether the lower arbitration standards
were applied.' 92 Recognizing that a court could not vacate the award
outside of the Federal Arbitration Act provisions in 9 U.S.C. § 10, the
Court stated: "In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin
agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators
in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts,
to judicial review for error in interpretation." ' 93
If Wilko is read in its entirety, it is readily apparent that the
Court's dicta relies on a non sequitur argument: there was no claim
before the Court that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the
law in any way. Essentially, the Court was speculating that courts
could review an arbitration proceeding if such a claim was made. The
Wilko Court did not cite any authority for this observation, and,
indeed, it may have been a simple judicial slip of the pen. Case law
indicates that reviewing courts, while acknowledging the existence of
the Wilko dicta, steadfastly refused to vacate any awards on this
reasoning for many years."'
The standard under the manifest disregard of the law doctrine is
very high. The award must be truly irrational. This requirement is
set out in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, %
involving a securities Rule 10(b)(4) controversy, as follows:
Manifest disregard of the law by arbitrators is a judiciallycreated ground for vacating their arbitration award ....
Although the bounds of this ground have never been defined, it
189. 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
190. Id. at 438.
191. Id. at 436.
192. Id. at346-47.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp. 656 F. Supp. 160, 163-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
195. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
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clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect
to the law ....The error must have been obvious and capable
of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person
qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term
"disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence
of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore it or
pay no attention to it .... To adopt a less strict standard of
judicial review would be to undermine our well established
deference to arbitration as a favored method for settling disputes
when agreed to by the parties .... Judicial inquiry under the
"manifest disregard" standard is therefore extremely limited.
[T]he governing law alleged to have been ignored by the
arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.
We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award
because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or
applicability of laws urged upon it.' 96
Courts are very reluctant to find that even a gross
misinterpretation of applicable law or the application of inapplicable
law will rise to this level. In O.R. Securities, Inc. v. Professional
Planning Ass'n,'97 the Court held that the error must be so egregious
that the average arbitrator would instantly perceive it, and that the
arbitrator was actually aware of the legal standard but ignored it
anyway.' 98 Moreover, the movant may not simply rely on the outcome
of the arbitration, as "there must be some showing in the record, other
than the results obtained, that the arbitrator knew the law and
expressly disregarded it."' 99 However, in egregious cases the mere
record of the proceedings may suffice. For example, in Wallace v.
Buttar200 the plaintiff sought to hold the supervisors of a stockbroker
who had defrauded the plaintiff liable under the "control doctrine"
provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). 0 ' In order to apply this provision,
the statute required that the supervisors must have known of the fraud
and personally intended to defraud the plaintiff.2 2 There was nothing

196. Id. at 933-34.
197. 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988).
198. Id. at 747. See also Flexible Mfg. Sys. Prop., Ltd. v. Super Prod., Corp., 86 F.3d 96
(7th Cir. 1996); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (court will "vacate... only if the arbitrator's
refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices the rights of the parties and denies
them a fair hearing").
199. OR. Sec., Inc. v. Prof'l Planning Ass'n, 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988). See also
Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2001).
200. 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
201. Id. at 391.

202. Id.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 27:659

in the record to that effect and the award as to the supervisor's liability
was vacated.2 °3
It is important for counsel with clients contemplating an
arbitration agreement with foreign parties to realize that in
conjunction with federal common law under the Federal Arbitration
Act, New York recognizes, at least in principle, the manifest disregard
of the law doctrine.20 4 In contrast, there are no California cases that
recognize this doctrine. Given the emphatic position of the Moncharsh
Court that the only grounds for vacation of an award are those
expressly set forth in the arbitration statute, it is highly unlikely that
California will adopt the manifest disregard of law doctrine in the
future.
The main problem with applying the manifest mistake of law
doctrine is that without a documented record (which arbitrators are
under no obligation to produce), reviewing courts will be compelled
by default to uphold the award regardless of an incomprehensible
result.20 5 Moreover, even when the arbitrators do provide a record,
but that record is insufficient to fully explain the thinking or reasoning
of the arbitrators, courts generally will not compel the arbitrators to
fully explain the decision in the interests of speed and efficiency. For
example, in Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,2 °6 the
Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act a reviewing court
does not have the authority to remand the case to the arbitrators for a
detailed explanation of the damages accounting. 21 The Court went on
to state, unconvincingly, as follows:
More generally, it is simply not true that insistence on an
explanation of the decisionmaker's thought process is an
automatic requirement of "effective judicial review." In the
context of arbitration, where there is no statutory requirement
that the panel state its reasons, and (as here) none imposed by
the institution under whose auspices the arbitration occurred, it
would seem to turn on a balance between the interest in rooting
out possible error and the interest in assuring that judgment be
swift and economical. We agree with the Second Circuit [Sobel
v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, (2d Cir. 1972)] that the
latter must generally prevail. As the record here fails to indicate

203.
204.
1987).
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 394.
See, e.g., Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 656 F. Supp 160 (S.D.N.Y.
O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 747.
882 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 531.
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the probability of "manifest disregard" of the law, there is no
basis to insist on an explanation.20 8
2. The Narrow Public Policy Defense to Enforcement of the Award
Exception
Of particular interest to those dealing with transnational
contracts is the relationship of the manifest disregard of law doctrine
in federal common law and the provision in the New York Convention
29
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
that states:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that ....

(b) [t]he

recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.210
In the event that the arbitrators' disregard of the law rises to the
level of a breach of this public policy exception to recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, recognition of the award may
be denied.2 11 This rule is severely restricted, and as set forth in
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie
du Papier (RAKTA), this defense will be only be viable in the
following context:
We conclude, therefore, that the Convention's public policy
defense should be construed narrowly. Enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where
the forum state's most basic notions
enforcement would violate
21 2
of morality and justice.
Clearly, for this defense to be effective the arbitrators must make
more than a legal or factual error. In Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v.
Overseas Private Investment Corp., 213 the Jamaican government
208. Id. at 533.
209. Both the United States and Japan are signatories to this Convention. See Convention
at
Awards,
Arbitral
of
Foreign
Enforcement
and
the
Recognition
on
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXXII/treaty .asp
(last visited Mar. 7, 2004). The United Nations maintains a list of all participant nations
including dates of treaty ratification, accession, and succession. Id.
210. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, art. V, § 2(b), 84 Stat. 692, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 42.
211. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
212. Id. The court refused to re-examine the facts or law, stating that this was "a role
which we have emphatically declined to assume in the past and reject once again." Id. at 977.
213. 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 783 (1980).
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confiscated plaintiffs property worth, according to the plaintiff, $64
million, for which the arbitrators awarded only $1 million.2 14 Revere
claimed the arbitrators violated the rule of contra proferentem,
requiring that ambiguities in a contract must be construed against the
drafter. 21 As a matter of contract law Revere was correct, but the
reviewing court concluded: "[The public policy defense] is not
available for every party who manages to find some generally accepted
principle which is transgressed by the award. Rather, the award must
be so misconceived that it compels216 the violation of law or conduct
contrary to accepted public policy.
A good example of a successful use of the public policy defense
to the enforcement of the arbitrators' award was noted in dicta in
Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club v. Bailes 17 In Bailes, the
Court observed that the award cannot give legal life to a void contract,
as "there is a vast difference between the enforcement of a void
contract and the mere misunderstanding or misapplication of rules of
law ....

218

III. CONTRACTUAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
As described above, the procedural safeguards provided for in
civil litigation by statute and common law, intended to assure that a
dispute will be fully and fairly resolved, are not present in arbitration.
Arbitrators may admit hearsay and other legally inadmissible
evidence, hear testimony from witnesses that are not subject to cross
examination, communicate with third parties ex parte, and restrict the
ability of the parties to conduct discovery. Moreover, the arbitrators
may make findings of fact that are not in harmony with the evidence
and may grossly misinterpret or misapply the law; exercising their
imperium power by ignoring the law and applying their own sense of
justice. With the exception of the rare cases falling into the federal
and New York manifest disregard of law doctrine, judicial review of
arbitration is not possible.
The rationales espoused by the courts justifying this state of
affairs-that the parties have assumed the risk that the arbitrators
might err in evaluating the facts or misinterpret the law, or even make
214. Id. at 82.
215. Id. at82-83.
216. Id. at 83. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the mere misapplication of the law is
not grounds to set aside the award. Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and Iodine
Sales Corp., 274 F.2d. 805 (2d Cir. 1960). "[T]he misapplication ... of such rules of contract
interpretation does not rise to the stature of a "manifest disregard" of law." Id. at 808.
217. 33 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
218. Id. at 538.
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new law based on their own sense of justice---defy simple logic under
analysis. 219 To the contrary, the parties should have the right to
assume that the arbitrators will take great care to properly evaluate the
facts, and that the arbitrators will assiduously apply the correct law.
The parties certainly should not be expected to assume that arbitrators
might act as a rogue legislature and ignore facts.
Obviously, it is the duty of the arbitrators to apply the law
stipulated in the agreement for the simple reason that during the
negotiation, performance and execution of the contract the parties
have (ideally) regulated their actions to comply with the dictates and
principles of that law. When arbitrators misinterpret the law the
parties are operating under, or make new law, it is impossible for the
parties to know how they should have acted during the contractual
relationship, and it destroys the predictability of the law, which is an
indispensable foundation of all legitimate legal systems. From this
viewpoint, the lack of the courts' ability to review the arbitrators'
compliance with the law, as restricted by either statute or case law, is
one of the most serious problems with the current arbitration system.
Likewise, it is just as obvious that arbitrators should have the
duty to learn all of the facts of the case. A review of the California,
New York and Federal appellate cases suggests that arbitrators'
mistakes of fact, although potentially serious, do not appear to be
litigated as often as mistakes of law.22° The parties and their counsel
are generally aware that discovery will be limited in arbitration, but
they might not be aware of the mischief the loose rules of evidence and
the arbitrators' unfettered power to determine the relevant evidence
may cause. As noted above, the arbitrators can, and will, accept
evidence that no judicial court would accept, and the arbitrator may
ignore the facts in making his award. This power, the power to ignore
the facts of a case, was beyond even the imperium power of the Roman
Proetors.221 Federal and New York law provides that if the arbitrator
'
makes an award that is "completely irrational,"222
the award may be
vacated, but without a documented record of the evidence and
testimony this may be an impossibly high burden to meet.

219. Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D.359, 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 921.
220. This does not mean that mistakes of fact are not in reality a problem. Because of the
lack of a comprehensive discovery scheme in U.S. and Japanese arbitration, critical facts upon
which the determination of a case might turn may not be discovered, much less placed before the
arbitrator.
221. Seesupranotel2.
222. Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1972).
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Consequently, parties operating in the United States have
attempted to include language in the arbitration agreement that
provides for judicial review for errors of law or fact in the award. The
following sections describe how contractual stipulations have received
a mixed reception in the courts, and why counsel contemplating such a
provision should be aware of which jurisdictions will recognize and
enforce such provisions and which will not. There are no cases in
Japan where the courts have decided whether to recognize and enforce
such stipulations. Under California state law, the courts will not
enforce a contract stipulation for judicial review of either law or fact.
New York case law on this issue is absent, but would most likely
follow California for the reasons explained below. In contrast, the
federal courts dealing with arbitrations under the Federal Arbitration
Act, which includes jurisdiction over transnational contracts, are split.
The Ninth Circuit (including California), the Second Circuit
(including New York), and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits will
recognize contractual expansion of judicial review, whereas the
Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits will not.
A. CaliforniaCase Law
Arbitration case law in California has an internal inconsistency
that is never reconciled by the courts. There is general agreement that
arbitration is a creature of contract and that the parties have the power
to choose whatever specific arbitration process they desire.223 In
Ramirez v. Superior Court, the Court held that "a proceeding to
a suit in equity to compel specific
compel arbitration is in essence
22 4
contract.'
a
of
performance
It would appear that under Ramirez contractual provisions for
Recently, however,
judicial review ought to be enforceable.225
California courts have taken a radically different approach that
rigorously precludes the possibility of contractual judicial review and
exhibits an unseemly willingness to re-write contracts regardless of the
intent of the parties. For example, in Crowell v. Downey Community
Hospital Foundation,226 an emergency room doctor sought a
declaratory order compelling the hospital, with which he had an
employment contract, to arbitrate under the terms of the agreement
which included the following language:
223. Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, 862 P.2d 158, 161 (Cal. 1993) ("Private arbitration is a
matter of agreement between the parties and is governed by contract law.").
224. Ramirez v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting
Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 535 P.2d 341, 344 (Cal. 1975)).
225. Cf. id.
226. 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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[U]pon the petition of any party to the arbitration, a court shall
have the authority to review the transcript of the arbitration
proceedings and the arbitrator's award and shall have the
authority to vacate the arbitrator's award, in whole or in part, on
the basis that the award is not supported
by substantial evidence
2 27
or is based upon an error of law.
The Crowell Court held that the arbitration agreement had to be
construed in its entirety, including the arbitration clause provisions,
stating:
The provision for judicial review of the merits of the arbitration
award was so central to the arbitration agreement that it could
not be severed. To do so would be to create an entirely new
agreement to which neither party agreed ....

provision, a different arbitration process results.228

Without that

However, instead of meeting the contractual expectations of the
parties, the Court held that they could not as a matter of law contract
for the expansion of judicial review, and struck the entire arbitration
contract. 229 "Expanding the availability of judicial review of such
decisions 'would tend to deprive the parties to the arbitration
agreement of the very advantages the process is intended to
produce.' 23" The Court cited Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp.231 as
authority for the proposition that the statute does not allow any other
basis for judicial review, 232 and went on to cite Old Republic Insurance
Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. 23 3 as authority that
courts do not have jurisdiction as to contractual judicial review. 234 As
noted above, the Crofoot Court's conclusion that the statute
enumerated the exclusive grounds for judicial review is specious at
best.235

The Court's reliance on Old Republic was misplaced, as the facts
of that case were not on point. In Old Republic, the arbitration
contract called for the Court of Appeals to review the arbitrator's
actions, skipping over the trial court.2 36 The Court of Appeals held
227.
228.

Id.at 812.
Id. at 817.

229. Id.
230. Id. at 814 (quoting Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 903). However, Moncharsh had no such
contractual expansion of judicial review. See id. at 919.
231.

260 P.2d 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815.
53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817.
See supra note 183 for related discussion.
Old Republic, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
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that it only had jurisdiction to hear cases appealed from the trial court
and could not hear cases as a court of first instance.237
The dissent by Judge Nott in Crowell is more in harmony with
the principles that statutes should be strictly construed and that
private parties may contract at will. 238 He noted that, pursuant to
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281, an arbitration contract is as
enforceable as any other contract. 23 9 Further, he observed, "[N]either
do [the statutes] state that the statutory grounds are exclusive or that
parties cannot agree to additional grounds.""24 In conclusion, with
regard to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1286, Judge Nott noted
that "there is nothing in sections 1286.2 and 1286.6 or the Act which
prohibits the parties from agreeing to an expanded form of judicial
review. "241
In a subsequent case, a different California Court of Appeals
upheld the principle that an arbitration contract must be construed as
a whole, but also held that the Code of Civil Procedure would not
permit any judicial review except as expressly provided in the
statute. 2 42 In Oakland-Alameda, a dispute arose over how much a
professional basketball team was to pay for the use of a sports
stating that
facility.243 The arbitration agreement included a provision
244
review.
judicial
to
subject
be
would
law
the questions of
Citing Crowell, CC Partners sought to strike the entire
arbitration clause.245 In the main body of the contract, unlike the
contract in Crowell, the parties included a severance clause that
provided that in the event any part of the contract was declared
invalid, the remainder would not be affected.246 Consequently, the
Court severed the judicial review clause.247 Under the Court's
reasoning, to effectuate the contractual intentions and expectations of
the parties, the Court had no choice but to sever just the judicial
237. Id.
238. Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 818 (Nott, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 819.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 826. Judge Nott hints that this type of judicial oversight of the growing
arbitration industry is necessary because of the natural inclination of the arbitrators to favor those
parties (such as insurance companies) that will give the arbitrators more business in the future.
See id. at 827. For those representing foreign parties, parties who will not be a source of future
business for the arbitrators, this admittedly uncomfortable point should be kept in mind.
242. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363,
370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
243. Id. at 366-67.
244. Id. at 370.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 371.
247. Id. at 372.
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review clause and not strike the entire arbitration agreement as in
Crowell.24' Although the result in Oakland-Alameda appears to be
consistent with Crowell on the surface, it is highly questionable that
the parties actually intended to forgo a critical element of the
arbitration procedure.
B. New York Law is Likely to Follow California'sProhibition
As mentioned above, New York does not appear to have case law
addressing the contractual expansion of judicial review in arbitration
issue. However, it is relatively easy to predict that New York will
reach the same conclusion as did California and disallow the
contractual expansion of judicial review. The New York arbitration
statute, Civil Practice Law and Rules ("C.P.L.R.") § 7511, identifies
the usual basis for the vacation or modification of arbitration awards:
the occurrence of "corruption, fraud or misconduct, 2 49 if the
arbitrator was biased,25 ° or if the hearings were "so imperfectly
executed [that] a final and definite award was not made.""2 No other
grounds are mentioned.
Generally, as in California, New York courts are reluctant to
disturb the arbitration process, fearing that the "value" of the process
will decline. 2 As is usual, the arbitrator is not required to exclude
hearsay, is not bound by the rules of evidence, and is not bound by
substantive law unless required in the arbitration contract. 53 Even so,
if he misconstrues the applicable law, or misreads the contract, there is
no appeal.25 4 In In re Arbitration of Gleason v. Michael Vee Ltd.,2' the
Court held: "It is well settled that judicial review of an arbitrator's
award is severely limited and may not be vacated unless it is violative
of a strong public policy, is totally irrational, or clearly exceeds a
25 6
specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator."
248. Id. The court explained: "[W]e would be ignoring the parties' intent that the
remainder of their agreement 'shall not be affected' by the invalidity of any particular provision."
Id.
249. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(i) (1998).
250. Id. § 7511(b)(1)(ii).
251. Id. § 751 i(b)(1)(iii).
252. In re Goldfinger v. Lisker, 500 N.E.2d 857,859 (N.Y. 1986).
253. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that
"[the arbitrator] may do justice as he sees fit, applying his own sense of law and equity to the
facts as he finds them").
254. Id.
255. 726 N.Y.S.2d. 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
256. Id. (citing In re New York State Dep't of Tax and Fin., 661 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997)). The facts of this case are illustrative of the extent of an arbitrator's power to
form an award that is very unconventional. Here, a Tax Compliance Agent for the State of New
York was suspended due to allegations of nine counts of misconduct involving false filings and
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The New York cases on the exclusivity of the grounds upon
which judicial review may be based are short and contain very little
explanatory material beyond the conclusory holding in Reale v. Healy
New York Corp.,25 7 where the Court stated that "the grounds
enumerated... [in C.P.L.R. § 7511] for vacation of an award are
exclusive. '"2S8 There is no question, however, that the New York case
law is very emphatic that the statutory scheme is exclusive.259 As in
the California statute, there is no express language in the New York
statute to the effect that the statutory grounds are exclusive.260
Based on the fact that both New York and California case law
hold that the statutory provisions for judicial review are exclusive,
together with the expressed reluctance of the judiciary to intervene in
the arbitral process, it is reasonable to conclude that New York would
likewise find that a contractual expansion of judicial review will not be
allowed.
C. Contractingfor Judicial Review Under Federal Law
1. Federal Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act contains no provisions for the
contractual expansion of judicial review beyond the grounds provided
for in the statute itself.26 ' Federal case law on the contractual
expansion of judicial review is split along interesting lines. On the one
hand, the two most influential Circuits, the Second on the East Coast
(including New York state) and the Ninth on the West Coast
(including California), as well as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, will
recognize and enforce a contractual provision for judicial review. On
the other hand, the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits will not allow
contractual provisions for judicial review. There are no Supreme
Court cases on point, but given the pervasive influence of the Second
was in the process of challenging the suspension in arbitration. Id. The claimant died before the
conclusion of the arbitration. Id. The arbitrator determined that he was guilty of eight of the
nine allegations and that dismissal was warranted. Id. at 302-03. However, despite the finding
that he was guilty of eight violations, the arbitrator posthumously reinstated the claimant in
order to allow his estate to collect death benefits. Id. at 303. The New York Supreme Court
refused to find that the posthumous reinstatement of the claimant was improper, indicating that
unless the arbitrator's conduct was expressly prohibited it will not be contrary to public policy.
Id.
257. 388 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
258. Id.at 691.
259. Geneseo Police Benevolent Ass'n. Local 82 v. City of Geneseo, 458 N.Y.S.2d 384
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982), affd, 450 N.E.2d. 246 (N.Y. 1982).
260. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (1998).
261. 9 U.S.C. § 10(1993).
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and Ninth Circuits it seems likely that their view will ultimately
prevail.
a. FederalStatutory Law of JudicialReview
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration award
may be vacated by a federal court on the limited grounds enumerated
in the statute, which are similar to those in the various state statutes
and arbitration rules.262 Specifically, the arbitration contract is void
because of corruption, fraud, or misconduct of the arbitrator,
including bias, refusal to postpone the hearing for good cause, or
refusal to hear relevant evidence.2 63 There is no provision in the
Federal Arbitration Act regarding review for errors of fact or law, and
the federal courts have consistently declined to create a general judicial
exception, reserving review only under the "manifest error of fact or
law" doctrine, as first described in Wilko.264 Consequently, if the
arbitrator's error of fact or law seriously prejudices the interests of a
party, but the award does not rise to the "completely irrational""26
level, any right that party has to judicial review must be found in the
arbitration contract itself.
b. Supreme Court Cases on Enforcement of ArbitrationContracts
The split in the Circuits on the contractual expansion of judicial
review is based on different interpretations of two Supreme Court
cases dealing with the implementation of express contractual
provisions in arbitration agreements. 26 Neither of the Supreme Court
cases deals directly with the question of the enforceability of a
contractual stipulation for judicial review. Rather, both focus on the
issue of whether an arbitration agreement is to be enforced in all its
particulars. Essentially, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
arbitration agreements subject to the Federal Arbitration Act are to be
enforced according to their terms.
In Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University, the underlying dispute involved several
parties, most of whom had not entered into the arbitration agreement.
267 One party that was not obligated to arbitrate the
dispute sought to
262. Id. § 10(a).
263. Id. § 10(a)(1), (3).
264. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
265. Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 (1977).
266. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
267. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 470-71.
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proceedings and move forward with the civil
stay the arbitration
litigation claims, 268 as authorized by California Code of Civil
Procedure. 269 However, the Federal Arbitration Act has no similar
provision for a stay of legal proceedings, and the Supreme Court
proceeded to address the issue of whether the California law was
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.2 7' The Supreme Court
noted that there is no express preemption clause in the Federal
Arbitration Act, but express preemption language is not needed in
cases for the following reason:
[W]hen Congress has not completely displaced state regulation
in an area, state law may nonetheless be preempted to the extent
that it actually conflicts with federal law-that is to the extent
that it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 27'
As for the preemption issue, the Court found that the California
rule that stayed the arbitration until the legal claim is concluded did
not hinder the operation or the intent of the Federal Arbitration
Act.2 2 Addressing the broader issue of the parties' ability to modify
the statutory procedural rules of the arbitration in the contract, the
Court held that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under
a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate."2 73 The Court then stated that such a contract provision will
be valid unless it is vitiated under other legal grounds that would
invalidate any other type of contract.274 "Section 2 of the [Federal
Arbitration] Act therefore declares that a written agreement to
arbitrate in any contract involving interstate commerce or a maritime
transaction 'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. ,,,75
The Court then held that the Federal Arbitration Act "simply
requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate,
like other contracts, in accordance with their terms, ' ' 2 76 and that the
Federal Arbitration Act's primary purpose is "ensuring that private
268.

Id. at 471.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

CAL. CODE Cfy. PROC. § 1280 (1982).
Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-79.
Id. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Id. at 478.
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(P]arties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see
fit. ' 2 77 Finally, the Court noted that "[b]y permitting the courts to
'rigorously enforce' such agreements according to their terms, we give
effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without
doing violence to the policies behind the F[ederal] A[rbitration]
agreements are enforced according to their terms ....

A[ct]."278

The second case cited to with regularity by courts dealing with
this issue is Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,279 where the
arbitration agreement included a provision that punitive damages
could be awarded.2 8 The arbitration was held under the rules of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Board of Directors of the
New York Stock Exchange, applying New York law. 28 ' There was no
statutory or case law authority in New York for granting punitive
damages in arbitrations, 282 yet punitive damages were awarded in
conformance with the arbitration provisions of the contract.2 83 On
appeal, the District Court struck the punitive damages on the basis
that only the courts, and not arbitrators, could assess punitive
damages under New York law.284 The Supreme Court reversed.285
In Mastrobuono, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act
did preempt state law because the state law would have thwarted the
Federal Arbitration Act's policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
contracts according to their express terms. Citing Volt, the Court
stated as follows:
We have previously held that the F[ederal] A[rbitration] A[ct]'s
proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the
wishes of the contracting parties ....

[W]e think our decisions

in Allied-Bruce,286 Southland287 and Perry88 make clear that if
contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages
within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their
agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1985).
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 27:659

of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from
arbitration.289
c. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits' Recognition of Contractual
Judicial Review
The repeated language in Volt and Mastrobuono holding that the
clear intent of Congress was that arbitration agreements are to be
enforced in accordance with their terms led the influential Second and
Ninth Circuits, as well as the Fourth29 ° and Fifth Circuits, to
recognize contractual provisions that expanded judicial review.
In the Second Circuit, In re Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens (FICAL)
v. Midlands Metal Corp.291 involved the enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award. The arbitration agreement included a provision
stating:
Upon an application to the court for an order confirming said
award, the court shall have the power to review (1) whether the
findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator are, on the entire
record of said arbitration proceedings, supported by substantial
evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of law based on said
findings of fact the award should be affirmed, modified or
vacated.292
The court held that, as the obligation to arbitrate is a creation of
a contract, the parties may include a provision including judicial
review for error of law or fact as part of the entire arbitration
process . 2 " The court held that allowing courts to strike the expanded
judicial review clause would be to improperly judicially re-write the
agreement in a manner contrary to the expressed intent of the parties,
stating as follows:
It nevertheless remains that arbitration is wholly dependent on
agreement. It is well settled.., that a party cannot be
compelled to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed to so submit ... and ... that a court is precluded from
considering any issue that the parties have voluntarily agreed to
arbitrate.... From this it follows logically that a party cannot
289. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58 (footnotes added).
290. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit decision in an unpublished opinion.
See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 452245 at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997). As an unpublished opinion, Syncor Int'l cannot be cited as authority and will not be
discussed.
291. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
292. Id. at 242.
293. See id. at 244.
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be compelled to submit his dispute to arbitration under rules to
which he has not assented .... Here, absent the judicial review

provision, the parties to this action did not agree to arbitrate
their disputes.294
The court further found that there was no public policy in the
Federal Arbitration Act that would prohibit the inclusion of the
The court acknowledged that the
expanded judicial review.29
efficiency of the arbitration process would be somewhat lessened, but
this inefficiency would be by the agreement of the parties and thus
unobjectionable. % The court next noted that the burden of review
placed on the courts would be substantially similar to the standard
used by the courts in reviewing agency decisions under the Social
Security Act. 297 As for the substantial evidence standard to be applied
to the review process, the court held that "[s]o long as the arbitrators'
conclusions are within the realm of reasonableness, they will not be set
aside .

"..."298

A similar Fifth Circuit case, Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.,299 involved the installation of telephone
service for the use in inmates in a state prison. The arbitration
agreement stipulated that the award was to be binding, but that
"errors of law shall be subject to appeal."3 ' The District Court
rejected the enforceability of the provision in the interests of
"simplicity, informality, and expedition.""'' Citing Mastrobuono and
Volt, the Fifth Circuit reversed, stating:
Such a contractual modification is acceptable because, as the
Supreme Court has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of
contract and the F[ederal] A[rbitration] A[ct]'s pro-arbitration
policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the
contracting parties ....

[I]t does not follow that the FAA

prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under
different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such
a result would be quite inimical to the FAA's purpose of ensuring
that private agreements to arbitrateare enforced according to their
terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and the parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they might limit
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 244 (Internal citations omitted).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.
64 F.3d 993 (Sth Cir. 1995).
Id. at 995.
Id. at 997.
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by contract the issues they may arbitrate, so too may they
specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
conducted.3 °2
A later Fifth Circuit case, Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook,3 °3
involved an employment arbitration where the employee claimed that
she suffered emotional distress as a consequence of the employer's
efforts to improve her work performance." 4 The arbitrators awarded
Cook $200,000, which Hughes challenged as unsupported in the
record.3 ' The employment contract included the following language:
Either party may bring an action

. . .

to vacate an arbitration

award.... [T]he standard of review to be applied to the
arbitrator's finding of facts and conclusions of law will be the
same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision
of a trial court sitting without a jury.30 6
The District Court cited Mastrobuono and Volt, and concluded
that the expanded judicial review provision was enforceable. 3 7 The
District Court then vacated the award, as the emotional distress claim
was not supported in the record.30 8 Notably, the District Court never
mentioned the usual judicial deference to the arbitrator's findings of
fact, and simply applied a purely legal standard to vacate the award.30 9
The most influential case in the Ninth Circuit is LaPine
Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,310 involving the sale of computer
components made by Kyocera, a Japanese company, together with a
financing agreement for the manufacture of the components. The
District Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement that
mandated that there would need to be a written record of the
proceedings and that the District Court had jurisdiction to vacate,
modify or correct the award based on the Federal Arbitration Act or
"[w]here the arbitrator's finding of facts are not supported by
substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law
are erroneous." '' The District Court based its refusal to recognize
and enforce to the specific language of the arbitration agreement on
the grounds that the parties to the contract were seeking to alter the
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 996 (emphasis and alterations in original).
254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1172 (2001).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 594.
130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
909 F. Supp. 697, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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roles of the court as set forth by the Federal Arbitration Act, and that
judicial review was contrary to the general principles of arbitration.112
The District Court went on to cite Judge Posner's opinion in
Chicago Typographical Union #16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,313 to the
effect that the parties may not contract for review by the federal
courts, but were free to contract for an arbitral appellate board. 14 The
District Court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Gateway on the basis that the cases Gateway relied upon, Mastrobuono
and Volt, do not deal with the specific issue of expanding judicial
review by contractual stipulation of the parties.3 1 The District Court
also found a public policy ground for refusing to exercise judicial
review on the rather questionable basis that the record was lengthy,
unlike that in the Second Circuit's Fils, and thus would consume more
judicial time to review.316
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating: "We hold
that we must honor that [judicial review] agreement. We must not
disregard it by limiting our review to the Federal Arbitration Act
grounds. ' 31 7 The court cited the Volt decision to the effect that the
federal policy is to ensure that the arbitration contract will be enforced
312. Id. at 702, 705.
313. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). The court's reliance here on Chicago was ill founded.
In Chicago, the issue of contractual expansion of judicial review was never before the court. An
employer made changes in the underlying contract that the union felt were contra to other
agreements with the union. Id. at 1503. There was a split award when the arbitrator held that
some additions were proper, and others not. Id. The issue before the Chicago Court was
whether it had the power to review the meaning and interpretation of the contracts by the
arbitrator. Id. at 1504-05. There was no agreement in the arbitration clause regarding expanded
judicial review over anything, be it law, fact or contract interpretation. Id. at 1505. Judge Posner
stated as follows:
An agreement to submit a dispute over the interpretation of a labor or other contract
[is an agreement] to abide by the arbitrator's interpretation [of the contract]. If the
parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the
arbitrator's award. But they cannot contract for judicial review of that award; federal
jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.
Id. at 1505 (emphasis omitted). Essentially, it is apparent that Judge Posner was only speculating
as to what the parties might do, and to claim that this out of context dicta is a studied and briefed
holding rejecting contractual expansion of judicial review is irresponsible.
Judge Posner's concept of an arbitration appellate review board is interesting, but
unsatisfactory. The review board would have the same unfettered and ungoverned imperium as
the arbitrators, and could in their turn make errors of fact and law. The entire purpose of an
appeals system, as Judge Posner well knows, is to act as a judicial control mechanism to assure
that the lower decision is at least rational as to the finding of fact, and to likewise assure that
lower decision is based on the appropriate law. There would be no assurance that the review
board would act in such a manner or would simply function as a second arbitration session.
314. LaPine, 909 F. Supp. at 703.
315. Id. at 705.
316. Id. at 706.
317. 130 F.3d at 888.
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according to its terms. The court went on to state: "We perceive no
sufficient reason to pay less respect to the review provision than we
pay to the myriad of other agreements which the parties have been
pleased to make."3 8 The court criticized the District Court's
reasoning in rather harsh terms, stating that "[the District Court's
ruling] would turn the F[ederal] A[rbitration] A[ct] on its head," and
that "[b]y confirming an award without the searching review that the
parties have earlier agreed to, a court goes against the parties' wishes
and does the opposite of what Congress intended."3 '9
d. The Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits' Rejection of Contractual
Judicial Review
In contrast to the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have held that neither Volt nor
Mastrobuono are sufficient authority on which to base contractual
expansion of judicial review, with the Eighth Circuit not quite
decided. The following discussion describes the reasoning that has led
these Circuits to reject the contractual expansion of judicial review.
Given the better reasoning and adherence to the express language in
Volt and Mastrobuono that arbitration agreements are to be enforced
according to their terms, it is reasonable to predict that when the
Supreme Court takes up this issue directly, it will sanction contractual
expansion of judicial review.
In the Tenth Circuit, Ernst Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.32
involved arbitration over an underground oil leak in a pipeline under
plaintiffs property in a right of way granted in 1943.32 There was an
arbitration clause in the right of way agreement to which the parties
added a clause that facts "not supported by the evidence" would be
subject to judicial review.322 Amoco lost and appealed on the basis
that the facts as found by the arbitrator were not supported by the
evidence.323
The court refused to enforce the judicial review provision for two
reasons. First, the court relied on the familiar grounds that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not specifically provide for contractual
expansion of judicial review, holding that "[t]hese limited standards
manifest a legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 889.
Id. at 889, 890.
254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id.at 928 n.I,
Id.at 931.
See id. at 933.
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arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration
process. ' ' 4 The holdings in Volt and Mastrobuono that arbitration
contracts must be enforced according to their terms were held
inapplicable when it came 2to recognizing a contractual provision for
heightened judicial review.1 1
Second, the court rejected contractual expansion of judicial
review reasoning that it would be contrary to the public policy
favoring expedited dispute resolution in the arbitration process, stating
as follows:
Contractually expanded standards, particularly those that allow
for factual review, clearly threaten to undermine the
independence of the arbitration process and dilute the finality of
arbitration awards because, in order for arbitration awards to be
effective, courts must not only enforce the agreement to arbitrate
but also enforce the resulting arbitration awards.326
Finally, the court raised the argument that courts would 3be
27
placed in an "awkward position" if they had to review the facts.
Citing the concurring opinion by Judge Kozinski in LaPine, the court
stated that "[u]nder either expanded legal or expanded factual
standards" the job of the reviewing courts is different than the regular
job of the courts, thus justifying the rejection of the contract provision
for expanded judicial review. 2' This line of reasoning is presented
without explanation, probably because the majority's result-that is
the rejection of contractual expansion of judicial review-is exactly the
opposite of what Judge Kozinski decided.329 Judge Kozinski found
that that difference in the duties of the court as between that provided
for in the Federal Arbitration Act and that provided for in the contract
was, in the final analysis, irrelevant. 3 He found that although there
was no express authority for the federal courts to review arbitration
awards outside the parameters of the Federal Arbitration Act, that
alone did not prohibit federal courts from doing so, given the strong
Congressional intent that arbitration contracts are to be fully enforced
according to their express terms.33' Consequently, Judge Kozinski
324. Id. at 935.
325. Id. at 934 ("The decisions directing courts to honor parties' agreements and to resolve
close questions in favor of arbitration simply do not dictate that courts submit to varying
standards of review imposed by private contract.").
326. Id. at 935.
327. Id. at 935-36.
328. Id.at 936.
329. See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891.
330. See id.
331. Id.
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found that there was sufficient authority in the Federal Arbitration
Act to recognize and enforce contractual expansion of judicial review
beyond that provided for in the statutory language. 32 Judge Kozinski
stated in full as follows:
Thus, enforcing the arbitration agreement-even with enhanced
judicial review-will consume far fewer judicial resources than if
the case were given plenary adjudication. The rub is that the
work the district court must perform under this arbitration
clause is not a subset of what it would be doing if the case were
brought directly under diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
It's not just less work, it is different work. Nowhere has
Congress authorized courts to review arbitral awards under the
standards the parties here adopted.
Nevertheless, I conclude that we must enforce the arbitration
agreement according to its terms. The review to which the
parties have agreed is no different from that performed by the
district courts in appeals from administrative agencies and
bankruptcy courts, or on habeas corpus.... Given the strong
policy of party empowerment embodied in the Arbitration Act, I
see no reason why Congress would object to enforcement of this
agreement.
This is not quite an express congressional
authorization but, given the Arbitration Act's policy, it's
probably enough.333
The Ernst Bowen Court also cited the Eighth Circuit's UHC
Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp.a34 and the Seventh
Circuit's Chicago Typographical Union #16 v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Inc.33 as other circuits rejecting LaPine and Gateway.336 As indicated
above,337 Chicago Typographical cannot be valid authority for rejecting
the parties' right to contractually expand judicial review. The same
can be said for the Ernst Bowen Court's reliance on UHC. The UHC
dicta is quite misleading, as UHC did not specifically reject LaPine
with regard to contractual expansion of judicial review.33 Indeed, the
claims in UHC did not concern that issue, but rather the contractual
selection of controlling substantive law.339

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Id.
148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936, 937.
See supra note 313.
UHC, 148 F.3d at 994.
Id.
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In UHC, Computer Sciences was retained to process health care
claims for UHC.340 The arbitration contract provided that the arbitral
award would be "bound by controlling law" without specifying which
law-the Federal Arbitration Act, Minnesota or any other state lawapplied.34' After the arbitrators issued their award in favor of UHC
that was in conformance with the Federal Arbitration Act rules,
Computer Sciences appealed on the basis that Minnesota substantive
law, not the Federal Arbitration Act, was the "controlling" law as to
damages. 42 The Court found that the stipulation did not clearly
identify Minnesota law as the law of choice, and held that as a matter
of law this was insufficient to exclude the application of the Federal
Arbitration Act.343 Citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v Kaplan,344
the Court held that had the parties desired to have Minnesota law
apply, they would have needed a very specific contract provision
stating just that.34 S If the arbitration contract merely contains a vague
statement that state law will generally apply, such a statement will not
supplant Federal Arbitration Act control.346 In UHC, there was no
specific provision stating that damages would be subject to Minnesota
law, just a provision that the decision was "bound by controlling
law. "347
Thus, UHC really recognizes the common-sense proposition that
if the parties desire to include a specific arbitration procedure or
standard of law, any such provision must be "clear and unmistakable"
to be enforceable and recognized, as courts cannot make any
assumptions as to the intent of the parties. 48 As to the issue
concerning the contractual expansion of judicial review, the UHC
Court only referred in passing to LaPine, and certainly did not reject
LaPine as the Ernst Bowen Court indicates,349 for the simple reason
340. Id.
341. Id. at 995-96.
342. Id. at 994-95.
343. Id. at 997.
344. 514 U.S. 938 (1995). First Options involved the question of the arbitrability of the
arbitration agreement itself. Id. at 941. There the owners of a corporation claimed that they, as
individuals, could not be bound by an arbitration agreement signed by the corporation. Id. The
First Options Court held that "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is clea[r] and unmistakabl[e] evidence that they did so." Id. at 944
(alterations in original). The Court went on to hold that, as individuals, the owners were not
bound by the act of the corporation. Id. at 949.
345. UHC, 148 F.3d at 998.
346. Id. at 996 (citing Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indust., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 936-38 (6th Cir.
1998)).
347. Id. at 997.
348. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 52
U.S. 948 (1997).
349. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936-937.
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that the issue of contractual expansion of judicial review was not
before the Court.350
2. Federal Jurisdiction for Transnational Contracts
Transnational contracts are subject to federal jurisdiction and the
Federal Arbitration Act.3"' The Federal Arbitration Act does not in
itself provide an independent basis for jurisdiction, and neither can the
parties merely contract for Federal Arbitration Act jurisdiction-there
must be an independent constitutional basis for Federal Arbitration
Act jurisdiction.3 2 Jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act is
based on the text specifically stating that the Act will apply to
arbitration contracts between parties that are "among the several
States or with foreign nations."3 s3 Jurisdiction for transnational
contracts may also be found in transnational cases arbitrated under
pendant state court actions. The United States Supreme Court may
review when the highest court of a state makes a decision under that
state's law that is claimed to be repugnant to federal law, statutes, or
the Constitution, is in conflict with the purpose of a federal law, or
will hinder or frustrate the intent of federal law.35 4 For counsel with
clients engaged in international commerce, that fact alone will be
sufficient for Federal Arbitration Act jurisdiction.3 5
Although there is no express provision in the Federal Arbitration
Act that preempts state law, it will do so in most instances. Where a
state law actually conflicts with the federal law, or is an obstacle to the
express purposes of the federal law and the objectives of Congress,
state law will be preempted to eliminate that hindrance.3 6 Thus, in
the event that an arbitration dispute involving foreign commerce is
being heard in a state court with the Federal Arbitration Act claim
under pendant jurisdiction, the state court must apply Federal
Arbitration Act common law rather than state law if there is any
conflict. 3 7 Consequently, if the arbitration agreement contains a
contractual provision that provides for more extensive judicial review
of the arbitrator's award than is permitted under state law, the state

350.
351.
352.
F. Supp.
353.

UHC, 148 F.3d at 994-95.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1993).
Cf. Cosmoteck Mumessillik Ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketti v. Cosmotek U.S.A., Inc., 942
757, 759 (D. Conn. 1996).
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1993) (This is the familiar basis for federal diversity jurisdiction.).

354. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1993).
355.
356.
357.
v. Todd,

Varley v. Tarrytown Assoc., Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. (implicating the Supremacy Clause); Michelin Tire Corp.
568 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D. Md. 1983).
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court must apply federal, not state law. 358 As state law in California,
and probably New York, conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act in
the Ninth and Second Circuits, those state courts will be bound to
recognize contractual expansion of judicial review.
D. ContractualJudicial Review in Japan
There are no provisions in the 2003 Act or the Commercial
Arbitration Rules that expressly permit or prevent the parties from
contracting for judicial review of the award for errors of fact or law.359
Moreover, there is no case law on this issue under the pre-2003 Act
that we can use for guidance. Consequently, an analysis of the
possibility of including a contractual expansion and under Japanese
law must be based on an analysis of the 2003 Act itself.
The 2003 Act does not define the arbitration agreement as a
contract (keiyaku), but rather a document expressing mutual
agreement (g~i) to submit a matter to arbitration. 360 A mutual
agreement that is a juristic act is the very definition of an enforceable
contract in Japanese law. 36' Although the Japanese Civil Code
("J.C.C.") does not define the nature of a juristic act that creates a
bilateral contract, it is accepted that the mutual declaration of the
parties' intention to be bound by the terms of the agreement
constitutes such an act.362 A reading of the 2003 Act leaves no doubt
that an arbitration agreement is considered a binding contract.363
Although there are no provisions in the J.C.C. that define exactly
what a juristic act or contract is, the J.C.C. does provide that "[i]f the
parties to a juristic act have declared an intention which differs from
any provisions of laws or ordnances which are not concerned with
358. Ottawa Office Sys. Integration, Inc. v. FTF Bus. Sys., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). Where the case is before the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction, the
Federal Arbitration Act will apply, id. at 219, even though the arbitration clause might
specifically provide that state law and state arbitration rules shall apply, id. at 216-17.
359. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. VII, art. 44; Japan Commercial
Arbitration Rules, supra note 62.
360. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. I, art. 2(1).
361. The exact nature of a contract in Japan is not expressly set forth in any statute, but is
based on civil law principles of mutual consent.
362. See generally WARREN L. SHATTUCK & ZENTRARO KITAGAWA, UNITED STATESJAPANESE CONTRACT & SALE PROBLEMS 97, 98 (1973), regarding the Roman law concept of a
juristic act, defined roughly as a step in the process of creating a duty or a dispositive act, a legal
requisite (h6ritsu y6ken, Rechstatbestand), that brings about certain legal effects (hdritsu k6ka,
Rechtsfolge). This is a legal device used to implement the idea of party autonomy (shitekijichi),
which permits an individual to freely create a legal relation in the area of private transactions,
save where public policy would be violated. Party autonomy contemplates free exercise of
intention, and a declaration of intention is an essential element in a juristic act. Id. at 104.
363. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. I, art. 2(1).
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'
public order, such intention shall prevail."364
The J.C.C. also states
that "[a] juristic act which has for its object such matters as are
contrary to public order or good morals is null and void."365
Accordingly, the focus should not be whether the 2003 Act
specifically allows the contractual inclusion of judicial review (because
it is silent on the issue), but rather whether a contractual modification
of the arbitration agreement to include judicial review would be
contrary to public policy or good morals.
The 2003 Act recognizes, in many unrelated sections, that the
parties have the right to modify the provisions of the 2003 Act as they
see fit; thus, contractual modification of the Act generally cannot be
considered a violation of either public policy or good morals.
Specifically, the parties are "free" to decide as they please regarding
the provisions on the number of arbitrators,3 66 the procedure used to
choose the arbitrators,367 the procedure to challenge the arbitrators,368
the procedure to be followed in the arbitration,369 the place of
arbitration,370 the language of the arbitration,371 the rules concerning
the arbitration award,372 and the allocation of the costs of arbitration.373
The 2003 Act further recognizes that the parties may change specific
provisions of the 2003 Act by stating that, "unless otherwise agreed,"
the provisions of the 2003 Act apply.374 Specifically the 2003 Act
addresses the appointment of a succeeding arbitrator after a successful
challenge, 37 interim measures to protect the subject matter of the
arbitration,376 the date of the commencement of the arbitration
378
the arbitration panel process, 379
process,377 the oral hearing process,

any additional award,3a0 and the deposit of the arbitration costs.
Based on the forgoing, it is clear that the 2003 Act contemplates that
the parties will seek to modify the application of the 2003 Act by
364.

MINP art. 91.

365.
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367.
368.
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370.

Id. art. 90.
2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. III, art. 16(1).
Id. art. 17(1).
Id. art. 19(1).
Id. ch. III, art. 26(1).
Id. art. 28(1).
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Id. art. 30(1).
Id. ch. VI, art. 36(1).
Id. ch. IX, art. 49(1).
See, e.g., id. ch. I, art. (12)(1).
Id. ch. III, art. 22(1).
Id. ch. IV, art. 24(1).
Id. ch. V, art. 29(1).
Id. ch. V, art. 32(2).
Id. ch. VI, art. 37(4).
Id. ch. IX, art. 47(1).
Id. ch. IX, art. 48(1).
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including special provisions in the arbitration agreement. 382 Most
important to this analysis, the 2003 Act clearly anticipates the parties
having the legal right to agree to different arbitration procedures than
are provided for in the 2003 Act,383 and that the parties may agree that
the arbitrators will not have discretion to determine the admissibility
of evidence.384
The absence of any statutory provision regarding judicial review
in light of the numerous express provisions recognizing the parties'
right to alter the provisions in the 2003 Act could be interpreted to
indicate that such a right is not included. This is the approach taken
in the United States by the California Supreme Court, as well as the
Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts. However, the Second,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have reached the contrary conclusion on the
basis that arbitration agreements are contracts to be enforced as the
parties intended, and that the parties are free to include judicial review
contract provisions because such provisions are not specifically
prohibited by statute. In Japan, the conclusion that contractual
expansion of judicial review is permissible could be based on the
identical reasoning of the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as
two specific provisions in the Act.
The 2003 Act provides that "[t]he parties are free to agree on the
procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in the arbitral
proceedings" if consistent with law and public policy. 38 5 If there is no
agreement to the contrary, the arbitration tribunal will then
implement such procedures as it sees fit under the circumstances. 86
The key provision states that "[flailing an agreement under paragraph
(1), the power of the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine
the admissibility, necessity of investigation and weight of any
evidence. ' 387
This subsection clearly allows the parties to
contractually agree that the arbitral tribunal will not have the sole
power to "determine the admissibility, necessity of investigation and
weight of any evidence" by providing that a court of law shall have the
final say on the matter. 388 By inference, this subsection should enable
the parties to stipulate that, in order for the court to make such a
382. As for the public policy aspect, as indicated above, public policy objections under
Japanese Civil Code articles 90 and 91 must be based on the fact that the proposed change would
offend the most closely held notions of morality and justice. Neither this nor the "good morals"
proviso in article 90 are applicable in the least.
383. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. V, art. 26(1).
384. See id. art. 26(3).
385. Id. art. 26(1).
386. Id. art. 26(2).
387. Id. art. 26(3).
388. Id.
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determination, the court must be able to exercise judicial review over
the arbitrator's decisions on the evidence and the award.
The 2003 Act also states that "[tihe parties are free to agree on
the rules to be applied to the arbitral award by the arbitral tribunal."389
This language does not mean that the parties are free to create their
own law after the fact, but that they are to indicate the national law
that the arbitrators are to apply. Thus, in essence, the 2003 Act
compels the conclusion that the parties may contract for judicial
review.390 The 2003 Act suggests that arbitrators are bound by
substantive law to implement the provisions of the arbitration
agreement, stating: "The arbitral tribunal shall, if there is a contract
regarding the civil dispute referred to the arbitral tribunal, decide in
accordance with the terms of the contract. ,391 One could argue that
this section of the 2003 Act simply requires the arbitrators to enforce
the terms of the substantive contract and not the subsidiary or
auxiliary arbitration agreement. Such an interpretation is, in part,
correct. However, by doing so the 2003 Act is really indicating that
the contract is to be enforced in its entirety. This, of course, is exactly
the reasoning of the Second Circuit in In re Fils, the Fifth Circuit in
Gateway Technologies, and the Ninth Circuit in LaPine Technology
Corp.
There is one additional argument that would support Japan's
recognition and enforcement of a contract provision for contractual
Article 32 of the Japanese
review of the arbitration award.
Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be denied the right of access
to the courts. '392 Thus, every person has the constitutional right to
seek redress in the civil courts of law in regard to any contract dispute.
Under the 2003 Act, when the parties agree on arbitration, that
arbitration agreement acts to divest the civil courts of jurisdiction to
entertain a civil lawsuit on the subject matter of the arbitration
agreement.39 3 In Kinari Corp. v. Miyashita,394 a contractor appealed an
adverse arbitration award on the basis that the section 14 of the
Arbitration Act, divesting the court of jurisdiction, violated section 32
of the constitution. The appeal was denied on the sound reasoning
that although the parties did have the right to access to the courts, the
juridical act of entering into the arbitration agreement was a voluntary

389. Id. ch. VI, art. 36(1).
390. See id. art. 36(4).
391. Id.
392.

DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO[MEIJI KENPO] [Constitution] art. 32 (Japan).

393. 2003 Japan Arbitration Act, supra note 19, ch. II, art. 14(1).
394.

1194 HANREIJIHO 92 (D. Tokyo 1985).
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relinquishment of that right.39 However, in the event that the parties
do not relinquish all of their rights of access to the civil courts by
specifically reserving the right to appeal errors of fact or law, the right
to access to the civil courts should be preserved as a constitutional
matter under the reasoning in Kinari.
This conclusion is reinforced by the normal Japanese practice of
using "litigation contracts" (sosh6 keiyaku), wherein the parties may
agree to relinquish their constitutional rights to sue in the first
instance or to relinquish their rights to appeal. The rights to sue and
appeal are considered personal rights (kanri shobun ken), and these
rights may be waived or otherwise released if doing so does not violate
the J.C.C. provision that forbids a juristic act that violates public
order or good morals.396 These litigation contracts, by their very
definition, modify the parties' respective rights and duties under
substantive law, as well as under the provisions of the J.C.C.
Consequently, an arbitration agreement including a provision for
judicial review would appear to be consistent with the practice of using
litigation contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Counsel representing clients who are contemplating binding
arbitration as a substitute for litigation have the obligation to inform
their clients that arbitration cannot be considered a mere short-cut to a
full and fair resolution of possible disputes. The clients must be fully
aware that in arbitration, whether under the 2003 Japanese Arbitration
Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, or individual state law, the
arbitrators will restrict discovery. Thus, the client must anticipate
arbitrating the dispute without any additional information. Further,
they must also realize that even if a comprehensive discovery scheme
is agreed upon within the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator may
well ignore it and improperly restrict the scope of discovery.
Moreover, the arbitrator will accept as evidence all manner of
testimony and documents that may not be reliable, and may not be
subject to cross-examination, such as hearsay. Arbitrators might also
deem settlement negotiations and admissions in those negotiations
admissible.
The client must be aware that there is the very real possibility
that the arbitrators might, for whatever reason, misinterpret the
provisions of the contract, misinterpret or misapply the provisions of
substantive law, or even make their own law as they see fit. The client
395. See Ishida, supra note 19, at 22-23 (citing Kinari Corp., 1194 HANREIJIHO at 97).
396. MiNPO art. 90.
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must be fully informed that, absent a contractual provision for judicial
review, neither the United States' federal or state courts, nor Japanese
courts, will review arbitrators' award for errors of fact or law.
Then the client must evaluate the potential liability they may
incur under the contract if a potential dispute is arbitrated (in light of
the above problems) and determine if a loss would be financially
acceptable. The client must also evaluate the non-economic
repercussions of losing a dispute with this particular business partner.
Only then can the client determine if the drawbacks of arbitration, in
lieu of civil litigation, are an acceptable risk.
Counsel must avoid putting themselves in such a mortifying
position, as described by Judge Kott in Crowel, 397 of explaining to an
angry client (and presumably soon to be an ex-client) why they cannot
appeal an arbitration hearing that they should have won on the legal
and factual merits, but lost because the arbitrator made gross error of
fact and law. In arbitrations under the law of California and New
York this is a risk that the client must knowingly assume. For those
arbitrating transnational contract disputes in the Second, Fifth and
Ninth Circuits under the Federal Arbitration Act, this risk can be
mitigated with a contractual provision to expand judicial review. For
those arbitrating in Japan, there is currently no case law on the issue of
contractual provisions for judicial review, although it appears that
such a provision ought to be recognized. Thus, such a provision
should be in the arbitration agreement as a matter of course.

397. Crowell v. Downey Comm. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).

